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INTRODUCTION
It has been argued elsewhere that the colonization, dispossession, and
oppression of indigenous Australians has a close nexus with biological
determinism, scientific racism, and the ideology known as sociobiology. 1 In the
United States similar arguments are made concerning the historic maltreatment



Dr Allan Ardill, Griffith Law School, Griffith University, Ph.D., 2008.
See generally Allan Ardill, Sociobiology, Racism, and Australian Colonisation, 18 GRIFFITH L. REV.
82 (2009) (sociobiology); Loretta De Plevitz & Larry Croft, Aboriginality Under the Microscope: The
Biological Descent Test in Australian Law, 3 Q.U.T.L. & JUST. J. 1 (2003) (biology and scientific
racism); Tony Barta, Discourses of Genocide in Germany and Australia: A Linked History, 25
ABORIGINAL HIST. 37 (2001) (biological determinism and scientific racism); RAYMOND EVANS,
FIGHTING WORDS: WRITING ABOUT RACE (1999) (scientific racism).
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meted out to African Americans.2 Here, the concern is with the continuing colonial
control over the identity of Australian Aboriginal people.
This is critical because identity has a reciprocal relationship with health,
education, poverty, (loss of) language, native title, sovereignty and selfdetermination. It is argued below that the legal reasoning underpinning colonial
control over Aboriginal identity is steeped in sociobiological ideology. That is to
say, these ideas involve a hierarchy of race, and are further used to justify colonial
control instead of embracing the principle of self-determination. This colonial rule
fails to relinquish control in favour of self-determination in accord with
international standards and instead applies a descent test. This descent test is
sociobiological because it privileges biological criteria over the principle of selfdetermination.
The essay begins with an explanation of the term sociobiology as it is used
in this paper. This is followed by an outline of the choice between the principle of
self-determination and colonial rule through a regime of judicial tests. These
judicial tests are then critically assessed by way of an analysis of the cases that
have determined Aboriginality. The essay concludes that despite the plethora of
international tropes, rhetoric, and measures to decolonize, 3 Australia retains
colonial control over indigenous people through legal processes that can be
characterised as sociobiological. Among these is the colonial control over who can
be Aboriginal.

I. SOCIOBIOLOGY AND COLONIZATION
The relevance of sociobiology to colonization in general and to
Aboriginal identity in particular is that it provides a justification for colonial
control. So, for example, the widespread policies of removing Aboriginal children
from their families, which resulted infamously in the expression the Stolen
Generations, were policies conceived and justified by sociobiological ideas such as
polygenism, social Darwinism, phrenology and eugenics. Each of these systems of
thought shares the view that human nature is innate, in the sense that people are the
product of their heritage or physical composition or genes, without acknowledging
social construction. The Stolen Generations4 were the result of a colonial culture
2

See Keith E. Sealing, Blood Will Tell: Scientific Racism and the Legal Prohibitions Against
Miscegenation, 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 559 (2000).
3
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml (last visited May 7, 2012). According
to the United Nations, when it was formed after the Second World War, there were just 51 members and
today there are 192 member states, largely as a product of decolonization. Although World War II was
the catalyst for decolonization, it was not until the passing of the U.N. General Assembly Resolution on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples in 1960 that the principle of selfdetermination flourished alongside decolonization. MARTIN DIXON, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW 146 (3rd ed., 1990).
4
See Australian Human Rights Comm‘n, Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families, HREOC.GOV.AU
(April 1997), http://www.hreoc.gov.au/social_justice/bth_report/report/index.html; Tom Calma,
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Comm‘r, Australian Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Comm‘n, Response to Government to the National Apology to the Stolen Generations
(Feb. 13, 2008), available at
http://www.hreoc.gov.au/about/media/speeches/social_justice/2008/20080213let_the_healing_begin.ht
ml.
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steeped in the polygenist, social-Darwinist, phrenology, and eugenic twin beliefs
that Indigenous culture would inevitably be replaced by the more advanced
European culture and that Indigenous people were a doomed race.5 For these
reasons it can, and has, been argued that the colonisation, dispossession, and
oppression of Indigenous Australians has been underwritten and justified by
sociobiology.
Sociobiology is a modern science introduced to the world through the
work of Edward O. Wilson6 and for present purposes it includes the systems of
thought commencing with the theologically inspired polygenism and extending to
the contemporary evolutionary psychology and new institutional economics. 7 It is a
family of theories which has consistently flown the flag of what is critiqued in
other circles as biological determinism and is embodied by the idea that society and
human nature are the products of genes.8 The sociobiological tradition is one that is
continuously recycled over time and is used to assert that hierarchies on the basis of
race, class, gender, and sexuality are collectively the result of genes, or to
naturalise the products of human discretion as inevitable outcomes of laws of
nature.

II. SELF-DETERMINATION AND ABORIGINALITY
Recognition, as it concerns the identity of people, should be by way of
self-determination according to international law and not according to dubious
systems of nomenclature imposed by a coloniser. The principle of selfdetermination has been expected by a body of international law which largely
preceded the Australian cases on Aboriginal identity. Further, Australia has been a
signatory to this body of international law which suggests it should have been
applied to the cases discussed later in this essay. This body of international law
included both the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR), and today includes the 2007 United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.9
Although Australia opposed the adoption of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, it has since endorsed it. At the
time many of the cases discussed below were being decided, the Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples was under negotiation and in draft form. Therefore,
Australian courts were not under any legal obligation to respect its emerging
principles, which included ―[t]he right of indigenous peoples to belong to an
indigenous community or nation in accordance with their own traditions and
5

EVANS, supra note 1, at 118; Barta, supra note 1, at 44.
See EDWARD O. WILSON, SOCIOBIOLOGY: THE NEW SYNTHESIS (1976)
7
See Allan Ardill, Sociobiology and Law 18-35 (Feb. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Griffith
University), available at http://www4.gu.edu.au:8080/adt-root/public/adt-QGU20081103.141615/.
8
Id.; see also Ardill, supra note 1, at 83-93.
9
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; S. Treaty Doc.
95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art., Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967); United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), 46
I.L.M. 1013 (2007).
6
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customs...recognised as a fundamental exercise of self-determination in Article 9
Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 1994.‖10
On the other hand, most cases were decided after Australia had ratified the
ICCPR and ICESCR, both of which treat self-determination as a fundamental
principle of international law. They state, ―[a]ll peoples have the right of selfdetermination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.‖ 11
In addition, as Castan has observed, Art. 27 of the ICCPR crucially seeks
to preserve the culture, religion and language of persons belonging to ethnic,
religious or linguistic minorities.12 Article 27 is also aimed at ensuring the survival
of these minority groups, ―thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole.‖ 13 Castan
also notes:
The Human Rights Committee … recognised the importance of
land to culture and identity, and the interrelationship of land to
the obligation to accord self-determination. … The right of self
determination requires, amongst other things, that all peoples
must be able to freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources and that they may not be deprived of their own means
of subsistence (Art 1, para. 2). The Human Rights and Equal
Opportunity Commission has also emphasized that the practice of
extinguishing inherent aboriginal rights be abandoned as
incompatible with article 1 of the Covenant. 14
However, the Australian legal system has not applied self-determination
and has instead applied sociobiological approaches to the question of Aboriginality.
The Australian legal system has already received condemnation for choosing to
depart from the principle of self determination by the United Nations Committee
for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD). 15 This was
recognized in the leading case on Aboriginal identity where Justice Merkel

10

De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 8.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Art. 1, para. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S. Exec. Doc. D,
95-2 (1978); S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
12
Melissa Castan, Senior Lecturer, Monash University, Address at the Castan Centre for Human Rights
Law Conference, Human Rights 2003: The Year in Review (Dec. 4, 2003), available at
http://www.law.monash.edu.au/castancentre/events/2003/castan-paper.pdf (citing Human Rights
Committee General Comment 23, para. 9).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 3-4.
15
United Nations, Office of the High Comm‘r for Human Rights, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Decision 2 (54) on Australia, 54th Sess., A/54/18, para. 21 (2) (Mar. 18, 1999), available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/a2ba4bb337ca00498025686a005553d3?Opendocu
ment; United Nations, Office of the High Comm‘r for Human Rights, Comm. on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, Decision 2 (55) on Australia, 55th Sess., A/54/18, para. 23 (2) (Aug. 16, 1999),
available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/05af60d57303bb948025686a00595371?Opendocu
ment.
11
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commented, in less critical terms, but in no way shy of declaring the deficiency of
the Australian legal approach:
It is unfortunate that the determination of a person‘s Aboriginal
identity, a highly personal matter, has been left by a parliament
that is not representative of Aboriginal people to be determined
by a court which is also not representative of Aboriginal people.
While many would say that this is an inevitable incident of
political and legal life in Australia, I do not accept that that must
always be necessarily so. It is to be hoped that one day if
questions such as those that have arisen in the present case are
again required to be determined that that determination might be
made by independently constituted bodies or tribunals which are
representative of Aboriginal people.16
For Indigenous people world-wide self-determination is one of the most
important procedural legal and political objectives. 17 While Indigenous
sovereignties are invariably paramount, self-determination is often considered a
more achievable goal because it is already an accepted principle of international
law.18 In practical terms, self determination would mean that Indigenous
Australians would determine aboriginal identity according to their own laws and
institutions. As a generic concept, it means Indigenous people have the ability to
―consent to the terms of their relationship with the hitherto dominant structures‖ so
that they choose ―from a variety of political structural arrangements and means of
economic, social and cultural development.‖ 19 Of course, in specific terms, selfdetermination must be formulated by the Indigenous people themselves.
Despite international expectations and the fact that ―Australian Aboriginal
organisations have insisted on self-determination as the basis for Aboriginal
aspirations, self-determination is yet to be the basis for a decision in Australia at
law.‖20 Ultimately, self determination can only be introduced into law by statutory
law reform and this is unlikely given the declared policy of the previous federal
government,21 and based on the performance of the current government to date.22
16

Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205, 268 (Austl.) (referring to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission Act 1989 (Cth) (Austl.)).
17
See Frank Brennan, Aboriginal Self-Determination: The “New Partnership” of the 1990s, 17
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 53, 54 (1992); see generally Sarah Pritchard, The Right of Indigenous Peoples to
Self-Determination Under International Law, ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 4 (April 1992).
18
This is certainly the situation in Australia because almost all contemporary Indigenous scholars have
argued for varying degrees of Indigenous sovereignties to be recognised. In particular many note that
Indigenous sovereignties are a way of life for Indigenous people. In other words, regardless of colonial
claims to abstract legal sovereignty, Indigenous sovereignties refer to the way Indigenous culture
continues to be practised. See SOVEREIGN SUBJECTS: INDIGENOUS SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (Aileen
Moreton-Robinson ed., 2007).
19
Pritchard, supra note 17, at 6.
20
Id.
21
The former Howard Liberal/National Party coalition government declared its opposition to selfdetermination and took steps to dismantle the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission
originally set up to provide Indigenous people with a role in policy and administration. See Lyndon
Murphy, Who‘s Afraid of the Dark: Australia‘s Administration in Aboriginal Affairs (June 2000)
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Significantly, international law and in particular, Art. 1 of the ICCPR, is
unable to support anything more than normative claims by Indigenous Australians
because complaints are only possible under part three of the Optional Protocol of
the ICCPR.23 Therefore, self-determination is more an ideal than a mandatory
requirement of law. The reason for this is straightforward. Self-determination

(unpublished M.Phil. dissertation, University of Queensland) (on file with author). The Howard
government embraced assimilation in its approach to Indigenous affairs. In fact, as Prime Minister,
Howard actively avoided using the term self-determination as well as expressly stating on the 11 May
2000 that his government was opposed to self-determination. See Media Release, John Howard, Prime
Minister, Reconciliation Documents, (May 11, 2000), available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nphwb/20000731130000/http://www.pm.gov.au/index2.htm. Short points out that the former government
preferred the official approach of practical reconciliation which was code for economic self-sufficiency.
See Damien Short, Reconciliation, Assimilation, and the Indigenous Peoples of Australia, 5 FOURTH
WORLD J. 24, 24 (2002), available at http://www.cwis.org/fwj/51/d_short.html (particular attention to
footnote no. 38). The Howard government policy received some support from the Chair of Cape York
Land Council Noel Pearson who asked the former Prime Minister to consider legislation to convert
native title into freehold to encourage economic freedom. Sceptics saw this as wedge politics and a
cynical way to continue the dispossession of Indigenous people so that some community leaders might
personally benefit together with powerful commercial interests such as mining, pastoral and tourism
industry players. This issue received widespread media interest. See generally J.C. Altman, C. Linkhorn
& J. Clarke, Land Rights and Development Reform in Remote Australia, AUSTL. NAT‘L UNIV., CTR. FOR
ABORIGINAL ECON. POLICY, Discussion Paper No 276/2005, (2005); Insiders: Pearson Backs Howard‟s
Approach to Indigenous Affairs (Austl. Broad. Corp. television broadcast Jun. 5, 2005), transcript
available at http://www.abc.net.au/insiders/content/2005/s1384711.htm; Interview by Catherine
McGrath with John Howard, Prime Minister, (Aug. 4, 2003), transcript available at
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/10052/200308210000/www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/Interview399.html (in terms of avoiding use of the term selfdetermination or the reluctance to use it and the use of variations such as economic empowerment,
economic individualism, self-sufficiency, self-empowerment, self-motivating, and self-improvement so as
to avoid a culture of welfare dependency); Interview by Alan Jones with John Howard, Prime Minister
(2UE Radio broadcast May 29, 2000), transcript available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nphwb/20000731130000/http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2000/jones2905.htm ); Interview by John
Laws with John Howard, Prime Minister (2UE Radio broadcast May 29, 2000), transcript available at
http://pandora.nla.gov.au/nphwb/20000731130000/http://www.pm.gov.au/news/interviews/2000/laws2905.htm .
22
Although the Rudd government has taken steps to restore the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Austl.)
after it was suspended by the Howard government as part of its so-called intervention into Indigenous
communities, there are no signs of any move toward the self-determination spoken by a former Labor
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs in the Hawke/Keating era, Robert Tickner. The Hawke/Keating led
government of the 1980s and 1990s was still in office during the peak of the political wave concerning
Indigenous rights. For instance, 1992 was the year of the Mabo decision, and the United Nations
International Year for the World‘s Indigenous Peoples. Despite this, self-determination only got as far as
being enunciated as a key concept by then Aboriginal Affairs Minister, Mr Tickner. See Pritchard, supra
note 17, at 7. At the time of writing, the Rudd government was set to establish a new Aboriginal
governing body with no powers to implement policy or provide services. See Yuko Narushima,
Indigenous Body Won't Be Another ATSIC, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Aug. 26, 2009,available at
http://www.smh.com.au/national/indigenous-body-wont-be-another-atsic-20090825-ey42.html;
Interview by Kerry O‘Brien with Tom Calma, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Soc. Justice
Comm‘r(Austl. Broad. Corp. Radio broadcast Aug. 27, 2009), transcript available at
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2009/s2669141.htm.
23
See Brennan, supra note 17, at 57. Although the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR became operative on
25 December 1991, complaints aimed at seeking redress are not possible for alleged breaches of Article
1.
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would require altruistic action on the part of sovereign states to share power and
resources with colonised indigenous peoples. 24
Furthermore, self-determination does not mean that indigenous people
will be entitled to sovereignty. Instead, it effectively means the right of indigenous
peoples to determine their relationship with a State and their political status within
a sovereign nation.25 For precisely this reason, it can never deliver restitution, in
spite of the fact that in relation to key land masses within Australia‘s sovereign
territory, ―[t]here is no prior legal or philosophical reason why areas such as Torres
Strait and Arnhem Land could not be constituted as States of the federation or even
as separate nations sometime in the future.‖ 26
It is likely that most states will adopt the Brazilian position27 on this
question and require a form of self-determination that is less than full separate
statehood/sovereignty.28 Within these parameters, which can be described as intrastate-sovereign self-determination, Canada, the United States and New Zealand
provide lessons for Australian law.
Brennan, Gunn & Williams note that official Canadian government policy
provides for Indigenous peoples‘ self-determination with overarching sovereignty
retained in the Canadian state.29 The Canadian Federal Policy Guide: Aboriginal
Self-Government recognises the right of self-government as a protected right under
§ 35 of Canada‘s 1982 Constitution Act30 As a consequence, Canadian courts have
gone further than Australian courts recognizing a basic right to selfdetermination.31 In the United States, government policy has gone further than in

For example, Brennan states that ―[i]n international law, self-determination has come to have a
technical meaning in the decolonisation process. When a colonial power is withdrawing from a territory,
the people of the territory are to be assured a free choice in determining their political future.‖ Id. at 54.
However, attempts by Indigenous people to argue this should apply by analogy have been resisted by
sovereign states fearing that it would lead to the break-up of their nation. Instead, governments tend ―to
concede only internal self-determination to allow indigenous groups more autonomy as of right in the
domestic political arrangements of the nation. They are not prepared to recognise external selfdetermination which carries the right to separate nationhood and autonomous sovereignty.‖ Id.
25
Id. at 54.
26
Id. at 55.
27
The Brazilian position refers to the views expressed by the Brazilian Observer Delegation to the 1991
session of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations which was that ‖some articles of the Draft
Declaration of Indigenous Rights would ‘hardly be accepted by most governments if their present
language is maintained: for instance, those provisions which tend to attribute to indigenous people the
right to self-determination similar to that enjoyed by sovereign states under international law‘.― Id. at 55.
28
Id. at 55.
29
Sean Brennan, Brenda Gunn & George Williams, „Sovereignty‟ and its Relevance to Treaty-Making
Between Indigenous Peoples and Australian Governments, 26 SYDNEY L. REV. 307, 322 (2004).
30
Id. at 331.
31
Id. at 335. As Brennan et al explain, in the British Columbia Supreme Court decision, Campbell v
British Columbia (Att‟y Gen), ‗the Court held that self-government is a constitutionally protected right
under s 35, stating that ―the assertion of Crown sovereignty and the ability of the Crown to legislate in
relation to lands held by Aboriginal groups does not lead to the conclusion that powers of selfgovernment held by those groups were eliminated‖. The Court also found that ―after the assertion of
sovereignty by the British Crown ... the right of aboriginal people to govern themselves was diminished,
it was not extinguished‖, and that ―a right to self-government akin to a legislative power to make laws,
survived as one of the unwritten ‗underlying values‘ of the Constitution outside of the powers
distributed to Parliament and the legislatures in 1867‖.‘ (2000) 189 D.L.R. 4 th 333 (original references
omitted).
24
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Canada recognizing basic rights of self-government and extending a degree of
internal sovereignty to Indian tribes.32
In other words, the Clinton Presidency approach to Indian Tribal
governments included the ‗guiding principle‘ that the government ‗recognizes the
ongoing right of Indian tribes to self-government and supports tribal sovereignty
and self-determination‘.33 During the time of George W. Bush‘s presidency there
were ‗562 federally recognised American Indian Tribes and Alaska Native
Villages‘ in the United States.34 These communities enjoyed official tribal
sovereignty in the sense that they possessed ‗inherent governmental authority
deriving from [their] original sovereignty‘.35 This approach to government policy is
due to treaties between governments and Indian tribes, and despite abuses of the
terms of treaties Indian nations still retain significant control over their internal
affairs.36 As Brennan et al. acknowledge the United States Supreme Court has
recognized Indigenous sovereignty since the early 1800s in a series of cases before
the court led by Chief Justice Marshall.37 In essence, these cases recognised
residual sovereignty in the form of domestic dependent nations. 38 Therefore, ‗even
though the Indian tribes have no specific constitutional protection of their right to
self-government‘ they do enjoy self-government which is akin to selfdetermination.39
New Zealand stands apart from Australia, Canada and the United States
because it is not a federal system and it has a single treaty in place with Indigenous
people: The Treaty of Waitangi. 40 However, the Treaty of Waitangi has three
versions each with different expressions of the extent of Maori sovereignty. 41 The
position of the government to date has been to avoid references to Maori
sovereignty and to use the expression ‗self-determination‘ instead.42 Despite the
rhetoric, self-determination is yet to be delivered and remains a matter of
conjecture between Maori people and the government of New Zealand.43 This
approach to self-determination is mirrored in New Zealand courts which have
clung to the proposition that sovereignty was ceded by treaty to the Parliament of
New Zealand. 44 The practical effect is that the Treaty of Waitangi is more of a

32

Id. at 336.
For example, the Department of the Interior's Fiscal Year 1996 Interior
Accountability Report states: ‗Indian self-determination is the cornerstone of the
Federal relationship with sovereign tribal governments.‘
Id.
33
Id. at 337.
34
Id. at 336.
35
Brennan, supra note 29, at 336.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 338. These cases include: Johnson v. M‘Intosh 21 U.S. 543 (1823), Cherokee Nation v. Georgia
30 U.S. 1 (1831), Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. 515 (1832), and United States v. Kagama 118 U.S. 375
(1886).
38
Id.
39
Id. at 339.
40
Id at 340.
41
Brennan, supra note 29, at 340-341.
42
Id. at 341.
43
Id. at 342.
44
Id. at 342.
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restriction on Parliamentary sovereignty than it is a vehicle for Maori selfdetermination. Still, New Zealand has gone further than the Australian rejection of
self-determination and the Treaty of Waitangi at least ensures that New Zealand
administration and law are shaped under its ‗quasi-constitutional shadow‘.45
Australia is yet to move toward self-determination and instead has
preferred the more limited concepts of self-management and self-reliance.46
Compared with other jurisdictions there remains plenty of room for improvement
and there are no good reasons why Aboriginal identity should not be subject to selfdetermination rather than colonial determination as it presently stands-in other
words, self-determination subject to the Australian Constitution and laws of
Australia. The closest Australia has come to self-determination was in Shaw v Wolf,
where Justice Merkel applied a test involving self-identification which, though
falling well short of self-determination, was a step in that direction.47 Shaw
followed a chain of Australian cases each of which turned their backs on selfdetermination preferring instead to apply what is now known as the decent test to
determine Aboriginality.48
Before moving to that discussion on the cases dealing with Aboriginality it
is convenient to introduce the case law which has varied its approach to the descent
test. Many statutes use the term Aboriginal but do not define that term other than
to say it means a person of the Aboriginal race of Australia.49 Absent any
requirement to apply self-determination other than the normative force of
international law, the term is left to be understood according to the common law.
As such, courts have struggled to develop a coherent approach because they have
ignored international law50 and the secondary sources of legal literature 51 urging the
adoption of self-determination. Instead Australian courts have looked to
dictionaries,52 to the history of the Constitutional race power in section 51(xxvi), 53
to the preamble and aims sections of statutes,54 and to pseudo-science55 and
sociology for assistance.56 This patchy approach in the cases dealing with
Aboriginality is discussed next.

45

Id. at 343.
Id. at 318.
Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205, 268 (Austl.). This is considered a step in the right direction
because non-indigenous people and processes made the determination, as discussed below.
48
Id. (holding that self identification and community recognition may be necessary to supplement
descent and are probative of descent). The use of the term tests is a tad misleading because some of the
topics discussed immediately below are better described as elements, or even aspects, of the Australian
test which is in fact the descent test which comprises of three criteria: (1) descent, (2) self-identification,
(3) community recognition. See also De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1.
49
See, e.g., Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) s 4(1) (Austl.) (defines an
Aboriginal person as ―a person of the aboriginal race of Australia.‖); The Native Title Act 1993 (Cth.) s
253 (Austl.) (defines Aboriginal peoples to be ―peoples of the Aboriginal race of Australia.‖).
50
See De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 8.
51
See, e.g., AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM‘N, REP. NO. 31, THE RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL
CUSTOMARY LAWS (1986).
52
Queensland v Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611, 614-15 (Austl.).
53
Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577, 578 (Austl.).
54
Id. at 579.
55
See, e.g., De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 5, 7 & 14 (science is misguided if it looks for races).
56
Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205, 210 (Austl.).
46
47
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III. CASES ON IDENTITY
A. Tasmania v Commonwealth (1984) 158 CLR 1(Austl.)
Both judges and commentators tend to commence their search for a definition of
Aboriginal by referring to the Tasmanian Dams case,57 even though it was not the
first case to discuss the expression Aboriginal race.58 Nor was the term Aboriginal
a central issue in the case. The Tasmanian Dams case is important because it was
decided in Australia‘s paramount court, the High Court. The main issue was the
Commonwealth‘s Constitutional power to assert its World Heritage Properties
Conservation Act (World Heritage P.C. Act)59 to over-ride the Tasmanian State
government‘s plan to flood the Franklin and Gordon river systems as part of that
State‘s hydro-electricity scheme. One of the Constitutional bases 60 argued in the
High Court for the operation of the World Heritage P.C. Act was the race power
clause in section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution.61 All judges had to consider the
significance of sections 8 (1) & 11 of the World Heritage P.C. Act which declared
that several other substantive provisions in that Act were necessary as special laws
for the people of the Aboriginal race. Four of the seven Judges determined that the
provision was within the ambit of section 51(xxvi) of the Constitution and was
therefore valid law.62 However, in the course of their deliberations only two of the
seven Judges considered the meaning of Aboriginal race.63
Justice Brennan recognised that the term race ―is not a precise concept‖ but there is
―of course, a biological element in the concept.‖ 64 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Brennan considered similar cases in England and New Zealand after
observing the consensus reached between experts assembled before a UNESCO

57

See De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 2-3. All of the cases discussed later in this essay refer to the
explanation of Deane J.
58
See e.g., Muramats v Commwealth Electoral Officer (WA) (1923) 32 CLR 500, 507 (Austl.)
(aboriginal means people ―who are of the stock that inhabited the land at the time Europeans came to
it‖); Ofu-Koloi v Crown (1956) 96 CLR 172, 175 (―The fact that at, so to speak, the edges of the racial
classification there is an uncertainty of definition cannot make it difficult to apply it in the common run
of cases‖). These two earlier cases dealing with race both used what would be regarded today as racist
language.
59
World Heritage Properties Conservation Act, 1983, (Austl.).
60
Under the Australian Constitution a State law is invalid to the extent it is inconsistent with a federal
law under section 109. The main argument concerned the Commonwealth‘s external affairs power in
section 51(xxix) of the Constitution and its responsibilities to implement international treaties, in this
case The Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage. Other
constitutional arguments were made under the corporations power section 51(xx), the acquisition of
property power section 51(xxxi), and the prohibition on the Commonwealth from interfering with a
State‘s right to water for irrigation, in section 100 of the Constitution. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION S 51,
109.
61
The race power in section 51 (xxvi) of the Constitution provides that the federal parliament can enact
laws for ―The people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws‖. AUSTRALIAN
CONSTITUTION S 51. In short the argument here concerned whether the race power sustained the World
Heritage P.C. Act because the latter was necessary to protect Indigenous cultural heritage.
62
See Tasmania v Commonwealth (1984) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.).
63
Id. at 243-45(Brennan J), 272–74 (Deane J).
64
Id. at 243.
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conference held in Moscow in 1964.65 Justice Brennan quoted from a report of the
Special Rapporteur, commenting on the conference as follows:
They stated inter alia that all men living today belong to a single
species and are derived from a common stock (Art I); that pure
races in the sense of genetically homogeneous populations do not
exist in the human species (Art III); and that there is no national,
religious, geographic, linguistic or cultural group which
constitutes a race ipso facto (Art XII). The proposals concluded:
―The biological data given above stand in open contradiction to
the tenets of racism. Racist theories can in no way pretend to
have any scientific foundation.‖ … Popular notions of race,
however, have frequently disregarded the scientific evidence.
Prejudice and discrimination on the ground of race, color or
ethnic origin occur in a number of societies, where physical
appearance – notably skin color – and ethnic origin are accorded
prime importance.66
Aware that the consensus of the experts was that there is only one race – the human
race, Justice Brennan considered the New Zealand case of King-Ansell v Police
[1979] 2 NZLR 531. There, Justice Richardson commented on terms used in the
Race Relations Act (NZ):
… all four expressions race, color, national origins and ethnic
origins are concerned with antecedent rather than acquired
characteristics. It does not follow that the identifying
characteristics must be genetically determined at birth. The
ultimate ancestry of any New Zealander is not susceptible to
proof. Race is clearly used in its popular meaning. 67
However, reading these two passages together, and wanting to avoid ―prejudice and
discrimination‖ because the ―popular notions of race‖ and ―popular meaning‖ of
race ―have frequently disregarded the scientific evidence‖, Justice Brennan treated
this as a requirement ―to identify the biological element of the concept‖ of race. 68
Justice Brennan considered the obiter of Justice Kerr in Mandla v Dowell Lee69 and
contrasted the New Zealand and English approaches in the following way:
[Justice Richardson] discounted the importance of, if not the
necessity for, scientific proof of the biological element:

65

Id. (citing Senor Hernan Santa Cruz, the Special Rapporteur on Racial Discrimination, report to the
United Nations, Special Study on Racial Discrimination in Political, Economic, Social and Cultural
Spheres, 12-13, U.N. Doc. E/CN/4/Sub2/307/Rev.1 (1971)).
66
Id.
67
Id. (citing King-Ansell v Police (1979) 2 NZLR 531, 542 (Austl.)).
68
Tasmania v Commonwealth (1984) 158 CLR 1, 243 (Austl.).
69
Mandla v Dowell Lee (1983) Q.B. 1..
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The real test is whether the individuals or the group regard
themselves and are regarded by others in the community as
having a particular historical identity in terms of their color or
their racial, national or ethnic origins.
In England in Mandla v. Dowell Lee, Kerr LJ in reference to the
words ―race or ethnic or national origins‖ said: ―they clearly refer
to human characteristics with which a person is born and which
he or she cannot change, any more than the leopard can change
his spots.‖ 70
With a fear that the ambiguity of a cultural test might be conducive to
popular notions of racism, Justice Brennan put his faith in the ability of biology to
avoid this pitfall not realizing that it too is ambiguous and political, and
consequently the cultural test favored by Justice Richardson in King-Ansell v
Police was dismissed as inconclusive.71 To the contrary, a cultural test can only
ever be inconclusive where there is an intra-group dispute as discussed later in the
case of Shaw v Wolf.72 This is because as others have pointed out race, nationality,
ethnicity and community are socially constructed concepts. 73
Like Justice Brennan, but placing more emphasis on community recognition and
self-identification, Justice Deane in the Tasmanian Dams case remarked in obiter
that the words people of any race in s.51(xxvi) of the Constitution, ―[p]lainly …
have a wide and non-technical meaning.‖74 Therefore, for Justice Deane:
The phrase is, in my view, apposite to refer to all Australian
Aboriginals collectively. Any doubt, which might otherwise exist
in this regard, is removed by reference to the wording of par.
(xxvi) in its original form. The phrase is also apposite to refer to
any identifiable racial sub-group among Australian Aboriginals.
By ―Australian Aboriginal‖ I mean, in accordance with what I
understand to be the conventional meaning of that term, a person
of Aboriginal descent, albeit mixed, who identifies himself as
such and who is recognised by the Aboriginal community as an
Aboriginal.75
While this approach is a step removed from biological determinism, it still
means that biological determinism can be used to circumvent both self-

70

Tasmania, 158 CLR at 244 (citations omitted); but cf. Mandla v Dowell Lee [1983] Q.B. 1, at 19
(supporting the rejection of the biological test in favor of cultural criteria); see also De Plevitz & Croft,
supra note 1, at 14.
71
De Plevitz & Croft , supra note 1, at 2:
Their genetic heritage is fixed at birth; the historic, religious, spiritual and cultural
heritage are acquired and are susceptible to influences for which a law may provide.
Id.
72
(1999) 163 ALR 205 (Austl.), See supra p. ___, for discussion.
73
See ETIENNE BALIBAR & IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, RACE, NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES,
96 ff. (1991); King-Ansell v Police [1979] 2 NZLR 531, 542 (Richardson, J., separately).
74
Tasmania, 158 CLR at 273-74.
75
Id. at 274.
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identification and community recognition. This is in fact what has happened in
subsequent cases discussed below.76
B. Queensland v. Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611 (Austl.) & Att‟y-Gen. (Cth.) v.
Queensland (1990) 94 ALR 515 (Austl.).
In this case heard initially in the Federal Court before Justice Pincus and
later on appeal before three judges of the Full Federal Court, the Queensland
government sought to reduce the number of indigenous deaths in custody attributed
to its criminal justice system in the tally of the 1991 Royal Commission into
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody [hereinafter Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths].77 The
Queensland government sought to have the death of Darren Wouters excluded from
the tally. It did so by challenging the Aboriginality of Wouters who was born to an
Aboriginal mother with a Dutch father. Wouters died in a Brisbane watch-house.
The Letters Patent conferring power on Wyvill, the Royal Commissioner, to
76

Id. at 274-75. Interestingly, the future judicial view to be taken by a majority of Judges in the High
Court, tending to water down the then unrecognised concept of native title, is indicated by the
submission of senior counsel for Tasmania in this case, Mr Gleeson. Mr Gleeson was appointed as the
Chief Justice of the High Court many years later. In the Tasmanian Dams case, he submitted that the
relevant provisions (ss. 8 & 11of the World Heritage PC Act) were not a special law for the benefit of
people of the Aboriginal race. I reproduce here the response of Justice Deane to that submission in full
because the views of these two men (putting aside the extreme views of Justice Callinan, discussed
below) reflect the shape of the two opposing judicial approaches taken on native title in cases such as
Yorta Yorta, supra note 234. In the Tasmanian Dams case, Justice Deane condemned Mr Gleeson‘s
submission after summarising it as follows:
…―that their character was not that of a law with respect to the people of that race‖
and also that by ―definition, an ‗Aboriginal site‘ must be ‗identified property‘ and,
therefore, it must be of outstanding universal significance: a law for the protection
and conservation of sites if, and only if, they are of significance to the whole of
mankind‖ is the antithesis of a special law for the people of a particular race. In so
far as the character of the law is concerned, it was submitted that a law which
addresses no command either to Aboriginals as such or to other people cannot be
properly characterized as a law with respect to the people of the Aboriginal race.
The relationship between the Aboriginal people and the lands which they occupy
lies at the heart of traditional Aboriginal culture and traditional Aboriginal life. Past
violations of Aboriginal culture and Aboriginal life, both traditional and otherwise,
have not obliterated the fundamental importance to the Aboriginal people of
Australia of their ancient sites. To the contrary, one effect of the years since 1788
and of the emergence of Australia as a nation has been that Aboriginal sites which
would once have been of particular significance only to the members of a particular
tribe are now regarded, by those Australian Aboriginals who have moved, or been
born, away from ancient tribal grounds, as part of a general heritage of their race.
The dual requirement that a declaration can only be made in respect of a site if it is
both ‗of outstanding universal value‘ and ‗of particular significance to the people of
the Aboriginal race‘ means that only those Aboriginal sites which are of
extraordinary significance qualify for protection and conservation under ss. 8 and
11. A law protecting such sites is, in the one sense, a law for all Australians. It
appears to me, however, on any approach to language, that a law whose operation is
to protect and preserve sites of universal value which are of particular importance to
the Aboriginal people is also a special law for those people.
Tasmania, 158 CLR at 274-75.
77
ROYAL COMMISSION INTO ABORIGINAL DEATHS IN CUSTODY NATIONAL REPORT (last updated Apr.
29, 1998), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/IndigLRes/rciadic/.
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investigate deaths in custody did not contain a definition of the word Aboriginal.
The Queensland government contended that Wyvill was acting ultra vires by
including Wouters‘ death within the ambit of the Inquiry because he was allegedly
of ―distinctly European appearance.‖78
Justice Pincus framed the case before the court by asking the question, ―is
every person who is part-Aboriginal within the terms of reference [of the Inquiry
into Aboriginal Deaths]?‖79 The Justice reviewed earlier cases and consulted
dictionaries before following the characterisation given to Aboriginal in passing by
two judges of the High Court in the Tasmanian Dams Case. 80 In doing so Justice
Pincus rejected an expansive and beneficial interpretation for the purposes of the
Inquiry prefering a stricter notion of Aboriginal by applying what was to become
the descent test. As noted above, the descent test is applied by understanding the
term Aboriginal according to its ordinary usage in the sense that a person must
have both genetic and social factors.81 The submission of the Queensland
Government that the Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths had erred ―on the basis that a
proportion of Aboriginal genes is enough in itself to justify classifying their
possessor as an Aboriginal‖ was preferred.82 Justice Pincus, perhaps seeking to
avoid the problem of biological determinism by relying solely on genes, considered
that social factors were just as important in cases involving a person with limited
genetic heritage. He distinguished between ―part-Aboriginals‖ and Aboriginals in
the ―strictest sense‖ commenting:
There must be many people in Australia with, say, 1/64 th or
1/32nd Aboriginal genes, the presence of which is unknown to
them and undetected by others. Even if such a trace of Aboriginal
ancestry were proved, in my opinion the person concerned would
not ordinarily be called an Aboriginal. It is important to keep in
mind that the respondent‘s authority does not expressly include,
as it might have done, investigating deaths of part-Aboriginals.83
Justice Pincus held that Wouters had some limited proportion of
Aboriginal genes and was aware of his Aboriginal ancestry. However this did not
make him an Aboriginal at law. He was according to law ―distinctly of European
appearance‖ and raised in institutions and foster care from the time he was six
years of age until his premature death prior to his eighteenth birthday. 84 Limited
genetic Aboriginal heritage coupled with a European appearance, and little social
contact with other Aboriginals meant that the deceased Darren Wouters was not
within the terms of the Inquiry.

78

Queensland v Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611, 612 (Austl.).
Id.
80
Tasmania, 158 CLR at 243-44, 273-74.
81
Contra Gerhardy v Brown (1985) 159 CLR 70, 145 (Justice Deane shifts the emphasis from descent
and social factors,self and community identification, to ―descent or ethnic origin‖) (emphasis added).
82
Queensland, 90 ALR at 614.
83
Id. at 615.
84
Queensland v Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611, 619-90 (Austl.).
79
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Therefore, the use of the word descent as it appeared in obiter in the
earlier High Court Tasmanian Dams case had become the basis for this decision. 85
Justice Pincus had turned a definition developed in passing in another case from
mere obiter dicta to become the definitive test for Aboriginality – the ratio
decidendi. In this way, Justice Pincus had inadvertently made it more difficult to
meet an objective of the Inquiry into Aboriginal Deaths, which was to consider the
socio-economic and cultural issues surrounding the disproportionate rate of deaths
of Indigenous people in custody. By excluding persons such as Darren Wouters,
crucial social factors leading to deaths in custody would not be considered. Justice
Pincus chose to exclude Wouters on the basis that any advantages to the
effectiveness of the Inquiry were outweighed by the need to test for Aboriginality
according to law.86
The descent test had been misconstrued for at least three reasons. First,
because Justice Pincus erroneously assumed that it is possible to grade race
according to biology.87 The justice presumed that there was some minimal nonspecific genetic threshold which had to be met before someone could be Indigenous
in the absence of evidence of solid social factors such as self-identification and
community recognition. Second, in determining that Wouters did not meet the
social criteria to be Aboriginal Justice Pincus discounted the self-identification
evidence before him:
There is certainly evidence that Mr Wouters, a few years before he
died, became aware that he had Aboriginal blood and no doubt that
influenced his view of himself, but it did not do so to the extent of
making him in any sense part of the Aboriginal community. As far
as is known, the only time he lived in an Aboriginal household
after infancy was during the few days he spent with [his
Indigenous uncle] Mr Wally Adams and his wife. 88
In other words, even though his extended family - comprising of people who
regarded themselves as part of an Indigenous community – recognized Wouters as
part of their community, because he had not been raised in an Indigenous
household, he was not Aboriginal.

85

Tasmania v Commonwealth (1984) 158 CLR 1, 273-74 (Austl.).
Queensland, 90 ALR at 620 (Justice Pincus states ―I have received submissions (not from counsel)
which appeared to me not to invite an objective approach to the question posed. No-one could fail to be
moved by the fate of the people the respondent is concerned with, nor by the sad life-story of the young
man in issue in this case. It does not appear to me, however, that anything is gained by entertaining
propositions which cannot be defended in law, such as that anyone is an Aboriginal, for the purposes of
the respondent‘s inquiry, who is thought by some representatives of the Aboriginal community to be
one.‖).
87
Id. ―The remaining question is the genetic one. There is no doubt that despite having light skin and
blond hair, Mr Wouters had a significant infusion of Aboriginal genes, but what proportion is
unclear.‖Id. Justice Pincus continues commenting that only one of the three grand-parents was ―full
blooded Aboriginal‖ the other three ―only partly so,‖ therefore, ―so far as one can judge from the
photograph of Mrs Carol Wouters [Darren‘s mother], and indeed that of Mr Wouters deceased‖ the
―inference is they were or are only partly‖ Aboriginal. Id.
88
Id.
86
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Third, the reasoning contains vestiges of the doomed race ideology – the
idea that Indigenous people would die out in the competition for survival of the
fittest or have their blood diluted by marriage to the point of absolute
assimilation.89 This is important because Justice Pincus had remarked earlier in the
judgement that:
There was a finding that he identified himself to a number of
people as being of aboriginal descent but that does not necessarily
mean that he was an ―Aboriginal‖ under the ordinary
understanding of that term. Mr Rose argued that it would be absurd
to hold Mr Wouters not to have been an Aboriginal because his
mother was one. If that principle is correct, then there will never
come a point at which, as generations pass and Aboriginal blood is
diluted, one can postulate of a particular individual that he is not an
Aboriginal.90
Self-recognition was also minimized in favor of a concern that
assimilation might mean that one day in the future all Australian people might
potentially claim to be part of a colonial underclass.
The point is that no biological category91 is capable of deciding questions
whose essence is about politics and power, and judicial attempts to deny this fact
verge on ridiculous as the case of Darren Wouters shows.92 There the judicial

89

De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, n.7.
Queensland v Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611, 619 (Austl.).
91
i.e. - race, genes, blood, ethnicity etc.
92
Queensland, 90 ALR at 617-18. In the course of reaching the decision to exclude part-blood
Aboriginals from the Inquiry unless they identified with and were identified by an Indigenous
community, Justice Pincus made some extraordinary observations. Among the more notorious were: (1)
The comments concerning Justice Toohey sitting as Aboriginal Land Commissioner, where Justice
Toohey held s. 3(1) of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1976 (Cth), which included the expression
Aboriginal race of Australia, concerned the descendants of those people inhabiting Australia prior to
1788, and were explained by saying, ―[Justice Toohey] took the definition, presumably because of the
presence of the word race to be ‗genetic rather than social‘.‖ Id. at 616. Justice French later explained
(on appeal) that Justice Toohey was merely seeking to expand the pool of potential beneficiaries by
referring to a genetic test in the context of land rights using a purposive and beneficial approach to the
issue. Att‟y Gen. (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 94 ALR 515, 538 (Austl.); (2) The argument that their was
no good reason to move away from the golden rule of statutory interpretation (viz, that statutes be given
prima facie their plain and ordinary meaning) ignored Article 1of the ICCPR. Queensland, 90 ALR at
616; (3) A rejection of the pure social approach (viz, that the law requires some Aboriginal descent
because self-identification and community recognition will not be sufficient by themselves) renders the
principle of self- determination subordinate to a biological test, and ignores relevant legal literature
((e.g. AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT NO 31, THE RECOGNITION OF ABORIGINAL
CUSTOMARY LAWS (1986) (on the inclusive nature of indigenous culture and kinship. See also Martin
Flynn & Sue Stanton, Trial By Ordeal: The Stolen Generation In Court, 25(2) ALT. L.J. 75, 77 (2000))
Id.; and (4) Justice Pincus held that it was better to have a definition with some precision than to concern
the Inquiry and courts with a potentially open-ended class of people:
The majority of people who identify themselves as Aboriginal are, at least in the
Eastern States, only partly so. For example, the 1961 census figures included 1488
full blood and 13,228 ―half blood‖ Aboriginals in New South Wales. … there has
been a substantial decline in the number of New South Wales pure blooded
Aboriginals over 100 years and a considerable rise in the number of part90
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choice was really whether the Queensland government should be able to avoid its
accountability and responsibilities by reducing the numbers of deaths in its custody
or whether the Commissioner should be permitted to inquire freely and frankly into
the issue.93 This choice was dressed up as a question of law informed by science to
allow a decision in favor of a government over and above the victims of continuing
colonialism.
The decision means that it is now necessary for all elements to be made
out or that some of the elements need to be so strong that an absence of another
will not be fatal. Stated another way, after Queensland v Wyvill it is necessary that
a person has both genetic evidence of Aboriginal ancestry and strong evidence of
social factors such as community recognition or self-identification to qualify as
Aboriginal. A purposive test would instead afford a greater capacity for Indigenous
people to benefit.94 This should not be taken to suggest that Justice Pincus was
aiming to maintain colonial control or hierarchy. Still, although, his Honour
expressed an awareness of biological determinism,95 he nevertheless naturalized
hierarchy by under-privileging self-recognition.
On appeal, two of the three Full Federal Court Judges were just as
confounded as Justice Pincus at first instance even though the court unanimously
overturned the earlier decision.96 Justices Jenkinson and Spender held that the issue
was a question of fact and that the Commissioner‘s original determination should
only be interfered with if it was not one reasonably open to him or beyond his
jurisdiction, and in this case there was no such legal error made.97
However, in reaching their decisions, Justices Jenkinson and Spender
required at least non-trivial Aboriginal descent to be established in accord with an
―ordinary meaning‖.98 For Justice Spender ―neither the attribute of self recognition,
nor recognition by ‗the Aboriginal community‘ is a necessary integer in the
ordinary meaning‖ of Aboriginal, and ―the presence of either attribute, or even
both, is not sufficient to constitute a person an Aboriginal‖. 99 Instead ―[i]t seems to
me that this aspect of the matter can be put no higher than recognition as

Aboriginals in that State … It does not seem practicable, nor is it in accordance with
the requirement that the ordinary [at 617] meaning of the word ―Aboriginal‖ be
used, to proceed on the basis that every part-Aboriginal is intended to be included in
unqualified statutory references to ―Aboriginals‖.
Id. at 617 - 18.
93
Id. at 618 – 19. As Justice Pincus noted in this case, there is an administrative law and broader legal
tradition in favour of leaving such questions to the inquisitor (original fact-finder) and only over-turning
them where it can be proven on appeal that the original finding was ‗not merely dubious but wrong‘
according to law.
94
Att‟y Gen. (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 94 ALR 515, 536, 538-39 (Austl.) (French J., dissenting).
95
Queensland v Wyvill, 90 ALR at 617. Justice Pincus explained the earlier views expressed by Justice
Higgins in Muramats, supra note 58, as anachronistic, stating ―[i]f ‗of the stock‘ in the passage means
‗having any genetic trace,‘ then that is not the meaning which common usage attributes to Aboriginal
now, if it ever was.‖ Id.
96
Att‟y Gen. (Cth),94 ALR at 519, 522 (contrast Jenkinson & Spender JJ., with French J., who left open
the possibility that self-determination should be the appropriate test).
97
Id.
98
Id. at 521, 524.
99
Id, 523.
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Aboriginal by persons who are accepted by the person making the classification as
being of Aboriginal descent.‖ 100
In privileging the descent test, Justice Spender was careful not to exclude
altogether the social elements of the test pointing out that they are not irrelevant
considerations, and that self-identification and community recognition are
appropriate considerations in ―cases at the margin‖. 101 Similarly, for Justice
Jenkinson, ‖[t]he closer to the boundary the person‘s genetic history – or, more
accurately, the speaker‘s belief about that history – places him, the greater the
influence of his conduct and of conduct of the Aboriginal community.‖ 102
Both Justices Jenkinson and Spender persisted with the language of
racism throughout their judgments drawing on sociobiological terms such as
Aboriginal blood, Aboriginal genes, genetic history, mixed-race, racial sub-group,
and significant infusion of Aboriginal genes. In contrast, Justice French held that
the meaning of Aboriginal ought to be left open for the benefit of the Inquiry. 103
For precisely this reason, Justice French made specific reference to the purpose of
the inquiry and the ―public concern‖ leading up to the Inquiry:
Public concern over the High incidence of Aboriginal persons
dying in police lock-ups and prisons led to the establishment in
October 1987 of the Royal Commission … As already noted, the
terms of the head commissions now held by Mr Johnstone QC
require consideration of the social, cultural and legal factors which
appear to have a bearing on the deaths under investigation.
The general subject matter of the inquiry and the specific reference
to social, cultural and legal factors are not consistent with the
establishment of rigid definitional boundaries within the terms of
reference. In particular the characteristics, including social, cultural
and legal circumstances, of persons who are said to answer the
description Aboriginal will need to be considered. And that
consideration could well involve some reflection upon
characteristics by which membership of the Aboriginal people of

Att‟y Gen. (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 94 ALR 515, 523 (Austl.).
Id.
102
Id. at 518. Jenkinson J., held:
In a case where the proportion of Aboriginal blood in a person of mixed race is
thought to be small, or where uncertainty exists as to whether a person is in any
degree of Aboriginal descent, the word may be used or eschewed in reference to that
person under the influence of what may be called cultural circumstances.
Id. at 517.
103
Id. at 539.
When there is added to that factor [significant genetic heritage], as in this case, a
history apparently devoid of opportunity for development within the normal range
of parent/child relationships, then confusion as to identity and the absence of a sense
of belonging to a particular community is not surprising. These observations are not
made by way of speculation on the facts of this case, but as illustrative of the issues
which might properly arise for consideration in the inquiry. To pre-empt as
―jurisdictional facts‖ the issues of self identification and communal acceptance or
affiliation is to impose restrictions on the inquiry which its evident purpose and, in
that context, the language of the Letters Patent, will not support. Id
Id.
100
101
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Australia can be defined or recognized. It is not overstating the
position to say that, in a sense, the idea of what it is to be an
Aborigine in contemporary Australia may be under inquiry. 104
The purpose of the Inquiry necessitated the Commissioner have the
discretion to determine either way whether to exclude on the basis that ―genetic
heritage‖ was too trivial, or of no real significance, or to include where a person
has no Aboriginal genetic heritage but is regarded as Aboriginal because of selfidentification and communal affiliation.105
Justice French therefore rejected the approach of Justice Pincus because it
narrowed the ―concept of Aboriginal by adding two necessary conditions to that of
descent‖ and because the trial judge had interfered with the Commissioner‘s
decision to include Wouters in the Inquiry. 106 The self-identification and
community recognition elements of the test were not intended to restrict the scope
of this Inquiry, nor statutes, where the purpose was beneficial. Instead:
[T]he better view is that Aboriginal descent is a sufficient criterion
for classification as Aboriginal. That proposition must be read
subject to the right of the Commissioner to decline to inquire into a
case where the Aboriginal genetic heritage is so small as to be
trivial or of no real significance in relation to the overall purpose of
the Commission. It also leaves open the question whether a person
with no Aboriginal genetic heritage may be regarded as Aboriginal
by reason of self-identification and communal affiliation.107
Regrettably, although Justices Jenkinson and Spender agreed with the
orders made by Justice French, they reached that conclusion in such a way as to
leave self-determination as a subordinate concern to the issue of descent. Again,
this result is ironic because both Justices were conscious of the need to avoid
biological determinism and the need for deference to the Inquiry on questions of
fact. Therefore all three elements (self-identification, communal recognition, and
descent) remained significant for future disputes.108 On a more positive note,
Justice French was recently appointed as the Chief Justice of the High Court and so
his approach may be afforded more deference than that of his predecessors in
future cases.
C. Mabo v. Queensland (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1.(Austl.)
Unfortunately, the facts of Australia‘s leading native title case did not
permit the High Court to develop or change the judicial understanding of
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Id. at 536.
Id. at 536 & 539.
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Att‟y Gen. (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 94 ALR 515, 539 (Austl.).
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Id.
108
Id. at 539.
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Aboriginality.109 The facts of the Mabo case did not require any determination
about Aboriginal identity because the claim for native title involved the inhabitants
of small islands in the Torres Straight on the Murray Islands. There was no doubt
as to the identity or heritage of the inhabitants.110 Therefore identity was not in
question. What was in question was whether or not native title was part of the
common law of Australia and for this reason the High Court only mentions
Aboriginal identity in obiter.
The Mabo case referred to ―indigenous inhabitants and their
descendants‖,111 and referred to a community in terms of a ―group‖, ―clan‖, ―band‖
or ―society‖.112 Although, the Court expressed some interest in self-determination,
it still required a biological heritage. 113 For Justice Brennan, with whom Chief
Justice Mason and Justice McHugh concurred, ―native title can be possessed only
by the indigenous inhabitants and their decendants‖, 114 and so long as they ―remain
an identifiable community, the members of whom are identified by one another as
members of that community,‖115 and ―membership of the indigenous people
depends on biological descent from the indigenous people and on mutual
recognition of a particular person‘s membership by that person and by the elders or
other persons enjoying traditional authority among those people.‖116
Other judges were less prescriptive, including Justices Deane and
Guadron, stating ―…the contents of the rights and the identity of those entitled to
enjoy them must be ascertained by reference to that traditional law or custom.‖117
And for Justice Toohey, the identity of potential claimants was a question of
―social‖ grouping, ―… since occupancy is a question of fact, the ‗society‘ in
occupation need not correspond to the most significant social group among the
indigenous people.‖118 The Mabo case therefore maintained the notion of a descent
test according to biology and social factors such as self-identification and
community recognition.
Soon after the Mabo case was heard and in the context of heated political
controversy surrounding the decision, the federal government enacted the Native
Title Act 1993 [hereinafter NTA]. The NTA was introduced as a measure aimed at
placating the media controversy and political hystreria surrounding the Mabo
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Mabo v Queensland (1992) 107 ALR 1 (Austl.). The High Court held by a majority that native title
was recognised by the common law and was part of Australian law (Mason CJ, Brennan, Toohey,
McHugh, Deane and Gaudron JJ, with Dawson J dissenting). The main judgement is considered to be
that of Brennan J., with Mason CJ. and McHugh J. concurring. This does not mean that the other judges
forming the majority can be treated lightly. Toohey J. was considered a judge with expertise in land
rights, and the judgement of Deane and Gaudron JJ. is authoritative because it was a joint judgement.
110
Id. at 43.
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Id. at 42-45.
112
Id. at 43-44 (Brennan J), 62-64 (Deane & Gaudron JJ). These terms were used throughout the various
judgements in the Mabo case. It is also noteworthy that Justice Brennan, along with Justices Deane and
Gaudron, were of the view that an individual may be a potential claimant.
113
Id. at 65, 146-47. In particular, Justice Toohey favoured self-determination, while Justices Deane &
Gaudron implied as much.
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Mabo, 107 ALR at 42.
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Id. at 44.
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Id. at 51.
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Mabo v Queensland (1992) 107 ALR 1, 83 (Austl.).
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Id. at 148.
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decision.119 It was also introduced to address some of the technical legal questions
left unanswered by the court. It has as its main objects:
(a) to provide for the recognition and protection of native title;
and
(b) to establish ways in which future dealings affecting native
title may proceed and to set standards for those dealings; and
(c) to establish a mechanism for determining claims to native
title; and
(d) to provide for, or permit, the validation of past acts, and
intermediate period acts, invalidated because of the existence
of native title.120
The NTA does not shed light on the judicial notion of Aboriginality and in
§§ 24CD and 24DE refers to native title group as this phrase is defined by § 253.
Section 223 defines native title and refers to Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait
Islanders. Section 253 provides definitions for many terms used in the NTA
including Aboriginal peoples, stating ―‗Aboriginal peoples‘ means peoples of the
Aboriginal race of Australia‖. For this reason the question of Aboriginality remains
a matter of judicial discretion.
D. Mason v. Tritton [1994] 34 N.S.W.L.R. 572 (Austl.)
One of the first cases dealing with both the term Aboriginal and the
concept of native title was Mason v Tritton.121 In Mason, the appellant argued a
native title right to fish abalone as a defense to a breach of the Fisheries and Oyster
Farms Act.122 This case may be contrasted with the similar but later case of Yanner
v Eaton, which stands as somewhat of an anomaly, and is beyond the scope of this
paper.123
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See Melissa Castan & Sue Kee, The jurisprudence of denial: The political devolution of the concept
of native title, 28 ALT. L.J. 83-84 (2003). The amendments were subsequently condemned by the United
Nations. See CERD Decision 2 (54) on Australia; Australia 18/03/99; A/54/18, para. 21(2); CERD
Decision 2 (55) on Australia: Australia 16/08/99; A/54/18, para. 23(2). Since the amendments,
Australian courts made a series of decisions, ultimately culminating in the Yorta Yorta decision, which
has arguably returned the common law position on native title to pre-Mabo days. It is difficult to find
any commentators who have disagreed with this assertion, while there are many who have agreed. See
also Mark Gregory, Absent Owners: Should Native Title Require Continuing Physical Occupation of the
Land?, 20 ALT. L. J. 20 (1995); Bryan Keon-Cohen, Ten Years after Mabo 27 ALT. L.J. 136 (2002); Neil
Lofgren, Common Law Aboriginal Knowledge 3 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 10 (1995); and Peter Seidel,
Native Title: The Struggle for Justice for the Yorta Yorta Nation 29 ALT. L.J. 70 (2004).
120
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth.) s 3 (Austl.).
121
Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572 (Austl.).
122
Fisheries and Oyster Farms Act 1935 (NSW) (Austl.).
123
Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 (Austl.). This case is anomalous in the sense that few have been
won by Indigenous people since Mabo in 1992. Here the Court found in favour of Mr. Yanner, who
succeeded under s 211 of the Native Title Act 1993 to avoid prosecution under Queensland law for
hunting crocodiles. Section 211 provided immunity to those people who might otherwise be prosecuted
or required to obtain a licence under other laws where the activity is a traditional aspect of their native
title rights.
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Because the Native Title Act is silent on the question of the potential class
of claimants other than the § 253 definition, ―‗Aboriginal peoples‘ means peoples
of the Aboriginal race of Australia‖,124 it is necessary to look to the general law.
Judicial opinion in this respect has varied from purely biological definitions to
definitions seeking to avoid biological determinism. Among the biological
definitions was the decision in Pareroultja v Tickner.125 There the Court had to
determine the compatibility or otherwise of a situation where native title
overlapped with a proposed grant of land under a Land Rights statute. 126 The court
held that the two concepts were not incompatible after considering the beneficial
nature of the laws in question and the absence of any inconsistency between the
classes of persons meant to benefit under them. ―Membership of the indigenous
people depends on biological descent from the indigenous people and on mutual
recognition of a particular person‘s membership by that person and by elders or
other persons enjoying traditional authority among those people.‖ 127
In other words the court used a biological and social test to give effect to a statute
aimed at benefiting those who had suffered from the colonisation of Australia.
However, a purposive reading is not necessarily a guarantee that justice will be
done in cases where the statute aimed at benefiting Indigenous Australians meets
another statute aimed at allocating the commercial interests of non-Indigenous
Australians. In this situation the beneficial interest under the statute is subordinated
to commercial interests. This result was the essence of the decision in Mason.128
There the court imposed a strict requirement that potential Indigenous beneficiaries
have biological proof of their connection to the traditional right. In this respect the
reasoning was sociobiological.
In Mason, the competing commercial interest was that of a nonindigenous abalone fishing industry. 129 The appellant argued a native title right to
fish abalone as a defense to a breach of the 1935 Fisheries and Oyster Farms Act
(NSW) prohibiting fishing except under license. All three Judges found against the
appellant on the basis that he had not discharged an onus of proof, which included a
biological test. ―There must be evidence that the claimant is an indigenous person
and biological descendant of the indigenous clan or group who exercised traditional
customary rights in respect of the land when the Crown first asserted its
sovereignty.‖130
Despite a finding by the Magistrate at first instance that this element had
been satisfied relying on a genealogy reaching back to the 1880s the NSW Court of
Appeal regarded this as ―far from compelling‖ because it fell short of the threshold
date of 1788.131 For Justice Priestley (with whom Chief Judge Gleeson agreed) the
rule was clear:
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Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 253 (Austl.).
Pareroultja v Tickner (1993) 117 ALR 206 (Austl.).
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Land rights are grants made under statute to Indigenous people while native title stems from
traditional rights and responsibilities to land as recognised by common law.
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Pareroultja, 117 ALR at 209 –10 (Lockhart J., with O‘Loughlin & Whitlam JJ., concurring).
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Mason, 34 NSWLR at 575-95.
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Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 589, 600-01 (Austl.).
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Id. at 586.
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A person asserting entitlement to enjoyment of the interest at the
present day, must show biological descent from the group which
was observing the system of rules which the interest was part; that
is show biological descent dating back to just before the
establishment of the common law. … A person asserting such
entitlement must also show that the biological descendants of the
pre-common law group have continued and are continuing to
observe the system at the time the claim is asserted.132
Consequently, this meant that despite the obviousness of the claimant‘s
case both in terms of the fact that he was indigenous to the area and that his
descendants had a tradition of fishing in the waters, his defense to a prosecution for
breaching the Fisheries and Oyster Farms Act failed. It failed for want of
establishing a biological chain of descent and for want of satisfying an evidentiary
burden that taking abalone was according to tradition. 133
However, for President of the Court of Appeal Kirby, the law would not
impose a strict biological genealogy because this would be an unreasonable
evidentiary burden on people who had been subject to colonial policies of
segregation and relocation.134 Questions about biological descent were not
necessarily insurmountable provided there were no other obstacles. Here there were
other obstacles:
Fixed as we are with the magistrate's findings of fact, the appellant
was required, somehow, to overcome the finding that he had failed
to bring himself within the traditional claim which he had claimed
and which I would hold was proved in law, viz, the right to fish for
food for himself and his family or exchanging the same for other
food. The magistrate regarded it as fatal that the appellant had
failed, by evidence, to bring himself within that use — and to
exclude other uses which were equally possible, viz, sale to an
open commercial market which it was the very object of the
Regulation to control.135
Clearly, the possibility that the taking of abalone might be opportunistic
rather than a traditional practice was the decisive factor in this case at first instance
and before the NSW Court of Appeal. The fear that an interloper might be able to
exploit native title laws to circumvent the highly regulated abalone fishing industry
which grants privileges to certain people via a licensing system was at the forefront
132
133

Id. at 598 (references omitted).
Id. at 594 (Kirby P):
The outcome of this appeal can be simply stated. Mr Mason, in my view,
established the ingredients necessary in law to succeed in a claim for a native title in
respect of a right to fish. But he failed to provide sufficient evidence to prove that he
actually had been exercising such a native title.

Id.
134
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Id. at 588-89.
Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 588-89 (Austl.).
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of the minds of both the Magistrate and President Kirby. Similarly, Justice
Priestley expressed his concerns about competition between licensed and
unlicensed abalone fishing by concerning himself with ―the type of fishing‖
undertaken by the appellant.136 In a statement denying there was any scope for
judicial discretion, Justice Priestley (with whom Chief Justice Gleeson agreed),
considered that it was not the common law that destroyed native title rights but
rather the effect of time and European settlement. 137
This is a theme that runs through the reasoning of the later Chief Justice
Gleeson led High Court, curtailing native title rights as initially advanced in
Mabo.138 In these later cases on native title the High Court adopted a similar vein of
sociobiological reasoning in the sense that it sought to naturalise the
extinguishment of native title as the inevitable result of evolutionary change. In
other words native title would inevitable be washed away by a tide of history as a
superior colonial culture out-competed Indigenous culture in the struggle for
existence. This reasoning obscures not only the choices made by colonial decisionmakers of the past but also the continuing colonial role played by courts as they
exercise discretion depicted as beyond their control.
Justice Priestley reasoned that while fishing was indeed a presumed
incidence of native title, citing section 223(2) of the Native Title Act,139 it
remained for the claimant to prove that the type of fishing in dispute was within the
ambit of two basic legal propositions:
Proposition (1) was that the magistrate had made findings, or to the
extent that he had not made such findings, had been bound to do so
on the evidence before him, which showed that the claimed native
fishing right was part of a recognizable system, in existence
immediately before the common law became the law of the colony
of New South Wales, observed by an identifiable group of people
connected with a locality of which Dalmeny was a part, and that
the appellant was a member of a group both biologically descended
from the pre-common law group and still connected with the same
particular locality, and that the present day group and the appellant
himself were continuing to observe the system, at least so far as it
related to the fishing right. Proposition (2) was that any land in
relation to which the fishing right was being claimed was
unalienated Crown land in regard to which there had been no act of
the Crown extinguishing the native right. 140
136
137

Id. at 601.
Id. at 600:
… the coming of the common law to Australia did not of itself extinguish the
systems of rules acknowledged and observed by Aboriginal groups and
communities related to land, the time that has passed since then and European
settlement of the country have caused the foundation of native title to disappear in
many places.

Id.
138

See Western Australia v Ward (2000) 170 ALR 159 (Austl.), and the Yorta Yorta cases, infra note
222.
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Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223(2) (Austl.).
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Mason, 34 NSWLR at 601.
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Justice Priestley did not need to deal with the second of these, finding
instead that the first proposition had not been satisfied. This was despite the
evidence of two experts supporting the claimant‘s case. The first expert‘s evidence
was dismissed with the sentence: ―The evidence from this witness consisted
entirely of her report. She gave no oral evidence and was not cross-examined.‖141
The second expert, Dr. S. Colley, had reviewed the literature concerning
archaeological evidence for the collection and consumption of abalone by
Aboriginal people on the NSW South Coast, and had concluded:
A variety of archaeological studies and information derived
from the NSW NPWS Aboriginal Sites Register confirm that
abalone shells are commonly found in small quantities in
Aboriginal shell middens along the NSW south coast. None of
these archaeological studies were undertaken to establish the
presence of abalone and the recording of abalone in all cases was
incidental to the main aims of the research. Because abalone occurs
in most middens in small quantities it is likely that some studies
have overlooked or under-emphasized its presence and that the
occurrence of abalone is under-stated in the archaeological
literature.
Abalone has been documented from sites of different ages
between 3700 years ago (at Currarong) and after the time of
European contact (at Durras North). The archaeological evidence
presented here supports the argument that taking of abalone has
been a widespread customary practice of Aboriginal people on the
NSW south coast for at least the last 3-4000 years and this practice
continued, at least in some places, after European contact. 142
General evidence, therefore, rather than specific evidence will be regarded
as insufficient. In his opinion, and using a strict interpretation, Justice Priestley
considered that neither expert had satisfied the basic test to be applied that was
discerned from the various judgments in the Mabo case.143 The test to be applied
was as follows:
1. Because, if the native interest did not exist at the time when the
common law became the law of the colony, the radical title, the
legal estate and the beneficial estate in the relevant land all vested
together and undivided at that time in the Crown, any claimed
native interest can not now be recognised by the common law
unless it was in existence immediately before the common law
became the law of the colony: Brennan J (at 59-60, 69-70); Deane
J and Gaudron J (at 86); Toohey J (at 184-187).
141
142
143

Id. at 602.
Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 601-02 (Austl.).
Id. at 602.
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2. The native interest must be a recognizable part of a system of
rules
observed by an identifiable group of people connected with a
particular
locality: Brennan J (at 58, 70); Deane J and Gaudron J (at 86, 88,
108);
Toohey J (at 186-187, 188).
3. A person asserting entitlement to enjoyment of the interest at the
present day, must show biological descent from the group which
was observing the system of rules which the interest was part; that
is show biological descent dating back to just before the
establishment of the common law: Brennan J (at 70); implicit in
Deane, Gaudron and Toohey JJ in the references given in 2 above.
4. A person asserting such entitlement must also show that the
biological
descendants of the pre-common law group have continued and are
continuing to observe the system at the time the claim is asserted.
(References as for 3 above.)144
Applying this test to the evidence of the second expert, Dr. S. Cane,
Justice Priestley held that although the report could be accepted as proving the
claimant was a member of a family with a ―genuine historical association with the
south coast of NSW‖145 with a consistent family tradition of fishing, and that this
tradition was ―an important ingredient in the socio-economic life‖146 of those
indigenous people:
it seems plain that much more needed to be proved to comply with
the requirements. This seems to me to be clear enough simply
taking Dr Cane's two reports at their full face value. There was
nothing in them to show that the appellant was biologically
descended from any Aboriginal group dating back to just before
the establishment of the common law which observed a system of
rules relating either to fishing generally or to abalone in particular
on any specific part of the New South Wales South Coast.147
As a practical matter, it will be virtually impossible after such a strict
reading of Mabo (or section 211 of the Native Title Act), for Indigenous people to
raise a defense to an alleged breach of law on the basis of a native title right.148 The
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Id. at 598.
Id. at 602
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Id.
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Contra Yanner v Eaton (1999) 201 CLR 351 (Austl.). This assertion is valid despite the decision in
Yanner. There the facts were so overwhelmingly within the biological limits and the claim for native
title had already received recognition of basic title. In other situations claimants are less likely to be so
fortunate given the catastrophic effects of colonisation. Paradoxically, the need to redress past wrongs
was recognised in the preamble to the Native Title Act 1993 and so many other statutes (e.g. Aboriginal
145

201X

AUSTRALIAN ABORIGINALITY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY

27

detail of evidence required in such a short time frame and the costs involved render
the likelihood of success extremely remote.149 For example, the cross-examination
of one expert witness in Mason reveals the impossibility of Indigenous people
proving a traditional system of rules without the aid of white experts:
HALL: Yes, I am talking about the period prior to colonisation.
Firstly there is no evidence prior to colonisation of Aboriginal
tribal communities claiming any right to specific areas of coastal
waters for fishing purposes.
CANE: No, but I have said that there could have been totemic
association with those areas as implied by the evidence of Tindale,
and the totemic association of people with specific coastal animals.
(undecipherable)
HALL: Could you just deal with the question I am putting to you
that prior to colonisation there is no evidence from the material you
have gathered of the exercise by Aboriginal communities of rights
to fish in particular coastal areas.
CANE: No.
…
HALL: Well, apart from the fact of fishing by Aboriginal people in
the coastal waters are you aware of any Aboriginal law that deals
with the fishing rights or fishing practices?
CANE: No.150
In particular, Justice Priestley held that there was insufficient evidence of
the calibre provided in Milirrpum, Walden, and Mabo, of a system of rules,
whether by elders or other community members, which meant the present case
could be distinguished as one where the ―tide of history had washed away any real
acknowledgement of traditional law and … of traditional customs‖. 151 Therefore,
the violence of colonisation cannot be undone by law demonstrating that the legacy
of colonisation is very much contemporary and, possibly, perpetual. The judgement
was therefore implicitly sociobiological. It was implicitly sociobiological because it
implied that the denial of Indigenous rights is inevitable. That is to say the outcome
of laws of nature. It was explicitly sociobiological to the extent the court held:
There was nothing in them [evidence of traditions] to show that the
appellant was biologically descended from any Aboriginal group

and Torres Straight Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth)) which were intended by the legislature to
facilitate a material change in the circumstances of Indigenous Australians.
149
See Mason, 34 NSWLR at 602-03. The cross examination of Dr. Cane appears selectively extracted
in the judgment. The degree of detail required will not necessarily be readily available for presentation
as evidence to be recognized by a court.
150
Mason v Tritton (1994) 34 NSWLR 572, 603 (Austl.).
151
Id. at 604 (citing Milirrpum v Nabalco 17 FLR 141 (Austl.), Walden v Hensler 163 CLR 561
(Austl.), and Mabo v Queensland 175 CLR 1 (Austl.)). His Honour did not rule out the possibility of an
appropriate claim being brought under the Native Title Act if the relevant evidence could be mounted.
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dating back to just before the establishment of the common law
which observed a system of rules relating either to fishing
generally or to abalone in particular on any specific part of the
New South Wales South Coast.152
The evidence of Dr. Cane showed connections between the claimant‘s activities
and the traditions of Aboriginal people but not to the biological standard expected:
the material in his reports could support conclusions that the men in
relation to whom the questions were asked were members of families
elements of which could be traced back to the1880s or thereabouts,
some of whom were Aboriginal, some of whom were European,
some of whom at the 1880s‘ period seem to have been born in or not
far from Narooma and some of whom came from well away from
Narooma, as for example, La Perouse, the far South Coast of New
South Wales and Victoria. So far as the origins of theappellant's
own family can be made out from the genealogical evidence, they
appear mostly to have come from La Perouse. The material in the
report also showed that some members of the particular families on
whom Dr Cane focused were accustomed to fish the sea near
Narooma and that fishing was a significant part of the socioeconomic life of Aboriginal people generally (including families of
the mixed kind I have mentioned) all along the South Coast of New
South Wales.153
Had the court decided in favour of the appellant in Mason, there would
have been an issue about over-exploitation of a limited resource that would
otherwise require a license to be taken in commercial quantities. Any reservations
about this issue ought to have been left to the legislature to determine in
consultation with the Indigenous people concerned. Instead, Mason stands as one
of the first cases to narrow down the advances made in Mabo using a strict and
legalistic approach naturalised through the use of biological criteria rendering
native title virtually unattainable.154
In Mason, the descent test was applied requiring biological criteria in such
a way that it operated to exclude beneficial native title interests 155, whereas in
Gibbs, the descent test was applied so as to give a more inclusive effect. 156
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Id. at 602.
Id. at 603-04.
The word advances is italicized for the reasons discussed in Michael Mansell, Perspectives on Mabo:
The High Court Gives an Inch but Takes a Mile, 2 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 4 (1992).
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Mason, 34 NSWLR at 572.
156
Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577, 584-85 (Austl.). In this case no conclusions were drawn
applying the stated legal principles to the facts, at the request of the protagonists.
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E. Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577 (Austl.)
In Gibbs v.Capewell, the court was asked to declare the true meaning of
the expression Aboriginal person as it was used in sections 101 & 102 of the
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act.157 There, the petitioner
(Gibbs) was contesting the validity of recent elections and the capacity of certain
candidates and electors to be eligible to stand and vote for office on the basis that
they were not Indigenous. The first respondent (Capewell) had stood as a candidate
and was joined by the Australian Electoral Commission (second respondent) and
the then Commonwealth Minister for Aboriginal and Islander Affairs, Senator
Herron (third respondent).
The petitioner submitted that the relevant test was that where there was
only minimal Aboriginal genetic material present in a person they would not be
able to participate in elections unless they had community recognition. An absence
of genetic material would preclude participation.
Counsel for Capewell submitted that the expression Aboriginal persons
included those who may have no descent but self-identify as Aboriginal and have
community recognition. In other words, this interpretation would include people
adopted by the Indigenous community. The Minister submitted that any amount of
genetic material would suffice and that this would be sufficient preferring not to
recognize the concept of self-determination.158 The Australian Electoral
Commission did not make a substantive submission other than a commitment to
abide by any determination made by the court.
Justice Drummond noted that Aboriginal person was defined in section 4
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act to mean, ―a person of
the Aboriginal race of Australia‖. The Justice reflected on the earlier cases and
commented the term race is ―hopelessly imprecise‖159 and proceeded to analyze the
expression as a product of the statute under consideration by reference to the
preamble and objects in section 3. Significantly, the preamble mentioned among
other things:
… of the consequences of past injustices and to ensure that the
Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders receive that full
recognition within the Australian nation to which history, their
prior rights and interests, and their rich and diverse culture, fully
entitle them to aspire …160
Sub-section 3(a) states an object of the statute is ―to ensure maximum
participation of Aboriginal persons and Torres Strait Islanders in the formulation
and implementation of government policies that affect them …‖ 161
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Aboriginal and Torres Strait Isleander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) ss 101-102 (Austl.).
See supra notes 21 & 22, and accompanying text. Though not expressly stated, this official attitude
towards self-determination survives to the present day.
159
Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577, 579 (Austl.).
160
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) pmbl. (Austl.).
161
Id. at s 3.
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Based on a reading of the preamble and objects sections of the Act, Justice
Drummond determined that the intention of Parliament was to benefit descendants
of pre-European inhabitants as understood in ―ordinary speech‖. 162 Accordingly, it
followed that participants in the election must have ―Aboriginal genes‖ and that the
social criteria163 could never be sufficient in the absence of some ―Aboriginal
genes‖. Further, this determination excluded those people who had been adopted by
the Indigenous community. ―It follows that adoption by Aboriginals of a person
without Aboriginal descent and the raising of that person as an Aboriginal … will
not, because of the statutory requirement for descent, bring that person within the
description ‗Aboriginal person‘‖. 164
Not only is this reasoning sociobiological because it holds that genes
override environment and is therefore an extreme example of biological
determinism, it is a conclusion hostile to Indigenous culture and the concept of selfdetermination at international law.165 It also assumes an anachronistic view of
science – a view no longer accepted within social theory, or the philosophy of
science.166 Wallerstein notes that where race has been fixed it has been by statute
rather than science. 167 Justice Drummond went further and contemplated whether
the Act was intended to benefit persons of ―mixed descent‖ or just ―full blood
descendants‖.168 In the course of this excursion into the sociobiological abyss,
Justice Drummond remarked:
I can take judicial notice of the fact that there are few, if any, full
blood descendants of the pre-settlement inhabitants of the continent
living in any of these five regions [the five regions spanned the
State capitals Adelaide, Brisbane, Hobart, Perth and Sydney]: 20
years ago judicial notice was taken that ―for a long time it has been
widely known that there remain very few [Aboriginal] persons of
the full blood‖ in the whole continent…169
Gibbs, 128 ALR at 580. The alternative ―ordinary parlance‖ was also used. Id. at 583.
Meaning self-identification and community recognition.
164
Gibbs, 128 ALR at 580.
165
See Flynn & Stanton, supra note 92, at 77. As the authors have observed during their analysis of the
Stolen Generations case, Indigenous culture has a broader understanding of family and community.
At an early point in the strike-out application, the Commonwealth confidently
submitted that Lorna Cubillo‘s allegation of removal without the consent of her
mother must be false because Lorna Cubillo‘s mother had died before the date of
removal. It soon transpired that Lorna Cubillo‘s use of the term ―mother‖ in the
court proceedings was not a reference to her birth mother but to the woman who, in
accordance with Aboriginal culture, had assumed care of her following the death of
her birth mother.
Id. See also AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION REPORT NO 31, THE RECOGNITION OF
ABORIGINAL CUSTOMARY LAWS (1986).
166
See PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD (1978); see also PAUL FEYERABEND, FAREWELL TO
REASON (1990); Thomas Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research? in CRITICISM AND THE
GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE 1-23 (Imre Lakotas & Alan Musgrave eds., 1976).
167
BALIBAR & WALLERSTEIN, supra note 73, at 71 (―People shoot each other every day over the
question of labels. And yet, the very people who do so tend to deny that the issue is complex or puzzling
or indeed anything but self-evident.‖)
168
Id. at 580.
169
Id. at 581, citing Re Byrning [1976] VR 100 at 103 (Austl.).
162
163
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Put another way, because colonialism and the policies of assimilation have
left very few potential ―full blood‖ beneficiaries, the expression ―aboriginal
person‖ should be comprehended to mean all people including those with ―mixed
blood‖ or those with ―limited Aboriginal genetic heritage‖. 170
One consolation from the judgment was the rejection of Senator Herron‘s
submission that the genetic test was the only ―necessary‖ test. Counsel for the
Minister had argued that the presence of a cultural test would be an additional
barrier to participation particularly for those people who had been removed from
their families under earlier policies. While this submission had the appearance of
concern for those people, the Minister was more concerned to ensure that the then
government policy of resisting self-determination was left intact, and this was
expressed publicly by the Minister at that time 171 as well as being implicit in his
submissions via counsel that:
… the statutory definition of ―Aboriginal person‖ operates by
reference to genetic factors, not social ones, so it is irrelevant to
have regard to cultural considerations; race is determined at birth
and cannot subsequently be acquired or relinquished, while
culture is acquired from a person‘s upbringing and environment
and is not a necessary element of a person‘s race. 172
Justice Drummond rejected this submission noting that in the ―absence of
clear proof of Aboriginal descent‖, either self-identification or communal
recognition would be necessary. 173 In other words the so-called cultural factors
170

Id. at 581.
See ATSIC,“ATSIC to be strengthened” says Minister, ATSIC News, Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Commission, August 1998, p. 9, available at http://pandora.nla.gov.au/pan/41037/200505160000/www.atsic.gov.au/news_room/atsic_news/August_1998/page9.html
.The former federal government ultimately abolished the Aboriginal & Torres Straight Islander
Commission. But at the time the Minister impressed that he supported the organisation. As the following
quote explains, the Minister, Senator Herron, preferred the expression ―self-empowerment‖ to ―selfdetermination‖:
Australia was one of the earliest advocates for inclusion of self-determination in the
Draft Declaration, but the Government has recently changed this position.
Following a series of leaks to the Melbourne Age, it was confirmed that Cabinet had
agreed in July to alter the Australian Government‘s draft text on the Declaration to
substitute ―self-management‖ or ―self-empowerment‖ for the principle of selfdetermination. ―Self-empowerment‖ has been the guiding principle of the current
Minister, Senator John Herron. He launched the term at his Lyons Lecture in
November 1996, saying that it ―varies from self-determination in that it is a means
to an end — ultimately social and economic equality — rather than merely an end in
itself‖. He has more colloquially described the Government‘s aims as helping
Indigenous people ―to carry their own swags‖. Arguably, self-empowerment has a
more individual than collective focus. In justifying the Cabinet decision, the
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, told the Age that the term ―selfdetermination‖ might be used to justify the establishment of a separate state for
Indigenous peoples. He denied that the decision was a move to appease Federal
backbencher Pauline Hanson who had recently described the Draft Declaration as a
―treacherous sell out of the Australian people‖.
Id.
172
Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577, 581 (Austl.).
173
Id. at 584-5.
171
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become relevant where proof of Aboriginal descent is insubstantial and where
proof of descent is substantial that will suffice. Factors indicative of a ―substantial
degree of Aboriginal descent‖ will be genetic, or ―that the person possesses what
would be regarded by the generality of the Australian community as clear physical
characteristics associated with Aboriginals‖, even though ―a person‘s external
appearance may be deceptive of his or her racial origins‖. 174
In terms of the cultural criteria:
The less the degree of Aboriginal descent, the more important
cultural circumstances become in determining whether a person
is ―Aboriginal‖. A person with a small degree of Aboriginal
descent who genuinely identifies as an Aboriginal and who has
Aboriginal communal recognition as such would I think be
described in current ordinary usage as an ―Aboriginal person‖
and would be so regarded for the purposes of the Act. But where
a person has only a small degree of Aboriginal descent, either
genuine self-identification as an Aboriginal alone or Aboriginal
communal recognition as such by itself may suffice, according to
the circumstances.175
Clearly the approach taken by Jutice Drummond is the opposite of the
intention of Article 1 of the ICCPR because it removes any possibility for people to
be identified as Aboriginal according to customary law. It reflects continuing
colonial practice in the sense that the colonial authority is exercising power of the
Indigenous people by retaining control over their identity. Further, this exercise of
power is by way of a system of science that has been hostile to the culture of the
Indigenous people concerned who place little or no emphasis in their culture on
genes and biology, and instead have their own systems for understanding who is
recognized in their community. 176 In fact, Justice Drummond had some
understanding of the importance of community recognition and expressly
mentioned that it may ―be the best evidence available‖ for establishing descent
after relegating it as subordinate to the descent test. 177

174

Id. at 584.
Id. at 584-85.
176
De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 8.
While Aboriginal people may generally be direct descendants of the original
inhabitants of their particular part of Australia, their lines of descent are not
necessarily biological. Indigenous customary law does not rely on linear proof of
descent in the Judeo-Christian genealogical form … An indigenous person from
Central Australia, for example, will have many fathers and mothers. A person may
have been adopted into a Kinship group where there is no direct or suitable
offspring to carry out ceremonial obligations.
Id.
177
Id. at 585.
Proof of communal recognition as an Aboriginal may, given the difficulties of proof
of Aboriginal descent flowing from, among other things, the lack of written family
records, be the best evidence available of proof of Aboriginal descent.
Id.
175
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Defenders of the sociobiological judicial approaches discussed above
might contend there needs to be an objective way to sort out disputes where an
Indigenous community rejects a person claiming to be indigenous. 178 This point can
be conceded provided the starting point is self-determination together with an
understanding that biological criteria (genes, blood, DNA, etc) are not
determinative of descent.179 Still, any suggestion that there may be opportunistic
claims in the absence of an objective test must be rejected on at least three grounds.
First, this view incorrectly assumes that cultural criteria are necessarily subjective,
and instead, it is more likely cultural approaches will be the closest one might get
to any objectivity. Second, it is, as already noted contrary to international law,
which expects self-determination in the absence of counter-justifications (mere
speculation of opportunism is not a counter-justification). Third, it is highly
unlikely that opportunistic claims have been or would ever be made – there is no
evidence to support the speculation.180
F. Shaw v. Wolf (1999) 163 A.L.R. 205 (Austl.)
This was another case where the past impacts of colonialism (this time
Tasmanian genocide and the forced break-up of families) had to be confronted in
the course of settling a dispute between people asserting, and others denying
community recognition for the purposes of ATSIC elections. 181
In Shaw, Justice Merkel tried to move beyond the biological approach
used in the earlier cases while retaining the emphasis on all three of the usual
elements: (1) Descent – family history, (2) Self-identification, and (3) Community
recognition. Descent was treated as the key criterion. Alone it would not
necessarily be sufficient and hence all three should be considered with the other
two elements merely probative of descent. Therefore, the descent test is still
capable of outweighing the other criteria and did so in this case.182 Consequently
this means that by virtue of the doctrine of precedent the biological approach is
likely to remain the central feature in future cases despite Justice Merkel‘s rejection
of the ―scientific‖ approach and his observation that race is a ―social rather than
genetic construct‖ and his emphasis on self-identification.183

178

It must be understood that such questions of contested identity are a legacy of colonisation because
indigenous people were physically removed from their communities and dispossessed from their land by
whites. Tasmania, the place in question here, provides one of the worst examples of colonial murder and
family break-up, facts recognised by the Court later in Shaw v Wolf. (1999) 163 ALR 205, 217 (Austl.).
179
This is in accord with the findings of the U.N. Special Rapporteur, supra note 65, and quoted by
Justice Brennan in Tasmania v Commonwealth (1984) 158 CLR 1 (Austl.).
180
Contra Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577, 584 (Austl.). The only risk might be for fraud and in
these situations community recognition would prevent that possibility. See De Plevitz & Croft, supra
note 1, at 9.
181
Shaw concerned a dispute about whether certain people were indigenous Tasmanians for the purposes
of the Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Commission Act 1989 (Cth) because they were not
recognised by other Indigenous people.
182
Two of the eleven respondents were held not to be Aboriginal on the basis of descent alone. Though
one of these people made no appearance and did not furnish evidence to support his version of descent.
183
Shaw v Wolf (1999) 163 ALR 205, 209, 268 (Austl.).
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Arguably, this case ―while painstaking and sympathetic, still falls short of
a test of Aboriginality defined by its own cultural traditions.‖ 184 This is because, in
the case of Ms. Oakford, the primary basis for rejecting her Aboriginality was that
her documentary evidence of her descent was outweighed by the probative value of
the documentary evidence presented against her. Yet Ms. Oakford had identified as
Indigenous from the age of 12 and had community recognition as an Aboriginal. In
fact, she had been duly elected to ATSIC office in the course of these elections.
Justice Merkel was conscious of this unfortunate outcome commenting that the
legislature was the appropriate authority to ensure that in future disputes Aboriginal
identity was determined by Indigenous organisations using their powers of selfdetermination rather than through a statute enacted ―by a parliament that is not
representative of Aboriginal people to be determined by a court which is also not
representative of Aboriginal people‖.185
Justice Merkel‘s approach to this litigation marked a considerable leap
forward for this area of law for many reasons. First, Justice Merkel sought to
achieve fairness for the litigants given the significance of identity to peoples‘ lives.
This was the Justice‘s primary objective within the unfortunate sociobiological
parameters of the legislation, the common law and the expectations of colonial
legal institutions without effective Indigenous participation and selfdetermination.186
Second, within the limits of the doctrine of precedent requiring Judge
Merkel to test for descent – which, until this case had been approached in
sociobiological terms given the preceding analysis on these cases - greater weight
was accorded to self-identification as probative of descent rather than the usual
approach privileging biological genealogy as virtually determinative of descent.
This is evident in that six of the eleven respondents, on the element of descent,
were initially found to have an open finding either way on the balance of
probabilities, yet in the final analysis were regarded as Aboriginal because their
self-identification tipped the balance in their favour on the question of descent. 187
Third, Justice Merkel emphasised the purpose of the statute‘s remedial
and beneficial aims, along with clause 23 of schedule 4 to the Act, requiring that
the court, ―shall be guided by the substantial merits and good conscience of each
case without regard to legal forms or technicalities, or whether the evidence before
it is in accordance with the law of evidence or not.‖ 188
Fourth, the devastating impact of colonisation was specifically mentioned
as a reason to move beyond an over-emphasis on the descent test. Two reasons for
this were that the colonial records were problematic and inconclusive, and the
consequences of forced family dislocation due to murder, disease and colonial
policies of assimilation would render those effects an inevitable and perpetual
problem for future generations. Both reasons were reiterated throughout the
judgement.189
184

De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 15.
Shaw, 163 ALR at 268.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 215-16 (citing Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 (Austl.)) (discussed below).
188
Id. at 208.
189
Shaw v Wolf (1999) 163 ALR 205, 208, 211, 217-22 (Austl.).
185
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Fifth, it followed that for these reasons, it needed to be accepted that
descent, self identification, and community recognition are socially constructed and
interdependent concepts.190
Sixth, greater weight should be granted to oral histories given the
problematic and inconsistent nature of archival and historical evidence. 191
Seventh, each personal case was treated as unique. 192
Finally, although the decision falls short of self determination, Judge
Merkel went as far as possible in this case to uphold the spirit of the principle. It
fell short because international law expects self-determination to be the key
criterion unless there are grounds for abandoning that approach. 193
The Australian approach remains preoccupied with a descent test, which
will need legislative reform in order to satisfy international expectations. Therefore,
a legacy of Shaw is likely to be the continued use of sociobiological reasoning in
questions about Aboriginal identity in the absence of law reform. This will not only
ensure that self-determination is ignored it will exacerbate the effects of colonial
rule. For instance, Justice Merkel approached the element of self-identification on
the basis that what mattered more were the reasons why a person identified as
Aboriginal rather than the fact that there might be objective evidence to that
effect.194 While this did not disadvantage any of the respondents in Shaw, it may do
so in future cases where a judge accentuates that aspect.
Also of concern was the continued emphasis and concern with
―opportunism‖ and ―genuineness‖. 195 Justice Merkel stressed that like
―genuineness‖, ―opportunism‖ is an inherently difficult criterion to apply to selfidentification of aboriginality. 196 The door is therefore open as to the place of these
Trojan horses in the test for self-identification, viz.,―…the Act mandates, and there
is a public interest in ensuring, that only ―Aboriginal persons‖ as defined, vote and
stand as candidates under the Act.‖197
Yet, on his own reasoning, Justice Merkel observed that there was very
little to be lost by the public or gained by an individual falsely asserting to be
Aboriginal:
The Act and other legislative schemes for the benefit of
Aboriginal persons are designed to provide benefits to remove
past and present disadvantage by creating special opportunities
190

Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 212-13.
192
Id. at 211 (―In my view the current Australian community accepts that the widely divergent and
differing histories and experiences of the process by which an Aboriginal person acquires and develops
an Aboriginal identity is, inherently, a process personal to and discrete for each individual.‖).
193
Instead, in Shaw, self-identification was treated as probative of descent. As mentioned above,
international standards expect self-determination to be applied except where there are compelling
grounds not to use that approach. Shaw discusses the concept of self-identification, and applies it to each
respondent in the judgment, along with ―descent‖ and ―community recognition‖. Id. at 210-13.
194
Id. at 212 (―…it is the genuineness of the identification, rather than its content, that is the critical
issue. To be genuine it is sufficient that the self-identification is bona fide and that the grounds for it are
real and not hypothetical or spurious.‖).
195
Shaw v Wolf (1999) 163 ALR 205, 212 (Austl.).
196
Id.
197
Id. at 215.
191

36

TRIBAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

for Aboriginal persons. In that context opportunism may be no
more than taking advantage of the opportunities specifically
created for such persons. Once the court is satisfied as to the
genuineness of self-identification there is no need to consider the
motives for it.198
This was a question of balance for Justice Merkel, using the Briginshaw
principle, but later judges may not be so cautious tempering a fear of opportunism
on that basis or with due regard for fairness. 199
In addition, because Justice Merkel stated unequivocally that he agreed
with the conclusions of Justice Drummond in Gibbs, this will add weight to that
decision when instead the paths taken in each case to reach those conclusions was
very different. In Gibbs, there was a sociobiological narrative underlying the
reasoning of Justice Drummond. In contrast, Justice Merkel‘s decision went to
great lengths to avoid sociobiological reasoning and although it remains
problematic for the foregoing reasons and notably falls short of the international
standard of self-identification it represents a step in the right direction.
IV. ABORIGINALITY AT LAW
Despite the variety of approaches taken to determine descent it is possible
to discern the various elements and tests that have been used in the cases. The
descent test has added many elements since it developed and these are discussed
below.200

A. Descent
Typically, in litigation concerning the term Aboriginal, the issues in
dispute will concern the ability to obtain statutory benefits or participate in
statutory schemes designed to address injustices of the past. Resource access and
inclusion are among the reasons given by white Australians for their need to
measure or determine the Aboriginality of indigenous people.201 De Plevitz and
198

Id. at 212.
The respondents were given the benefit of the doubt that the petitioners had not discharged their
burden of proof that the respondents were not of Aboriginal descent according to the Briginshaw
principle (viz, in cases with serious or grave consequences for the accused, evidence against them
should not be treated lightly). Supra note 187. Briginshaw was followed by G v H (1994) 124 ALR 353,
362 (Deane & Gaudron, JJ) (―…if there is an issue of 'importance and gravity' … due regard must be
had to its important and grave nature.‖). This was also cited with approval as the correct approach to be
taken in Shaw, 163 ALR at 215-216.
200
All the recent cases, from Queensland v Wyvill to Shaw v Wolf, applied this test with varying
emphases on the many aspects applicable to it.
201
De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 1:
In the era of colonial and post-colonial government, access to basic human rights
depended upon your race. If you were a ―full blooded Aboriginal native…[or] any
person apparently having an admixture of Aboriginal blood‖, a half-caste being the
―offspring of an Aboriginal mother and other than Aboriginal father‖ (but not of an
Aboriginal father and other than Aboriginal mother), a ―quadroon‖, or had a ―strain‖
of Aboriginal blood you were forced to live on Reserves or Missions, work for
199
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Croft observe that, ―[t]he test has three elements, all of which must be proved by
the person claiming to be Aboriginal: the person must identify as Aboriginal, the
Aboriginal community must recognize the person as Aboriginal, and the person is
Aboriginal by way of descent.‖202
The third element, ‗the person is Aboriginal by way of descent‘ can be
determined according to biological criteria or according to cultural criteria and
constitutes the descent test. However, in Australian courts, both sets of criteria
whether biological or cultural, are ultimately sociobiological. This is because the
cultural criteria are regarded as evidence of biological descent. Quite correctly De
Plevitz and Croft condemn this test because descent has been judicially interpreted
to mean ―quantum of genes‖.203 For De Plevitz and Croft this biological reasoning
is a ―misunderstanding of the scope of genetic science.‖204 Without suggesting
anything more than misunderstanding on the part of the judges concerned, this
assessment does not go far enough. It treats this legal error as though it occurs in a
vacuum when it is instead inextricably linked to relations of power even though the
judges themselves may not realize as such. 205 At one level subconscious thought is
informed by prejudice justified according to metaphysical beliefs thereby allowing
values associated with hierarchy and domination to inform the decision. 206 At
another level the indeterminacy of law and science provide an avenue for values
associated with the reproduction and maintenance of power to be incorporated into
the decision. This occurs because ―The validity or truth-content of a theory cannot
be resolved unequivocally on empirical grounds alone and, in this sense, all
theories are empirically indeterminate or ―factually underdetermined‖. 207
In other words empiricism is not an objective, non-political schema able to
be applied by either scientists or lawyers and judges to determine identity and
categories of any sort. In practice, empiricism is often a veil for the exercise of
rations, given minimal education, and needed governmental approval to marry, visit
relatives or use electrical appliances. The legacy of denial of education, selfgovernment and dignity is omnipresent today.
Id. (original footnotes omitted).
202
Id. at 2.
203
Id.
This test reflects a misunderstanding of the scope of genetic science. Though
science can show a person is descended from particular ancestors it cannot prove
that that descent is Aboriginal. A test of eligibility for benefits based on proof of
Aboriginality according to Aboriginal laws and customs and administered by
Aboriginal people would serve the same purpose as the biological descent test
without its potentially divisive effects.
Id.
204
Id.
205
Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege, in RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER: AN
ANTHOLOGY 94 –105 (Margaret Andersen & Patricia Hill Collins eds., 1992) (explaining that often,
white prejudice is completely unconscious yet so devastating in its effect).
206
For example, the theory of evolution is often the source for associated beliefs about human
institutions in terms of ―competition‖ and the ―struggle for survival‖, etc.
207
Tony Tinker, Panglossian Accounting Theories: The Science of Apologising in Style, 13 ACCT.
ORGS. & SOC‘Y 165, 173 (1988) (citing A. Giddens, 1979). Tinker elaborates on the problem of
indeterminacy providing three specific limitations as follows: (1) The lack of prior independence
between observational variables and theoretical variables; (2) The absence of satisfactory rules of
correspondence for linking observational variables and theoretical variables; and (3) The conservative
value biases inherent in empirical approaches that impede theoretical creativity and innovation. Id.
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power under the guise that empirical classifications are scientific and hence
politically-neutral. However,‖[t]he factual indeterminacy of theories opens a vent
through which individual scientists inevitably interject their social values. In this
context, it becomes important to analyze how scientific discretion is deployed and
exercised.‖208
In terms of ascertaining Aboriginal the application of biological tests are
ultimately a mechanism for mystifying209 an Indigenous reality which should be
determined according to principles of self determination illustrated above. 210 In
other words, the use of biological criteria to mystify social reality naturalizes the
status quo in terms of social conflict and deprives Indigenous people of their
identity and rights.211 Because classification is always indeterminate and political,
legal categories will necessarily be flexible so as to afford judicial discretion to
include or exclude depending on the personalities, power, nation, and capital
involved.212 Justice Merkel implicitly recognised this relationship in Shaw by
placing importance on the consequences of the classification for the adversaries in
the case.213
In calculating descent, the range of criteria used by courts can be loosely
categorised into two sub-categories: (1) descent according to biological criteria or
(2) descent according to cultural criteria. Both sub-categories are considered in
turn. This is followed by a brief consideration of the remaining elements which
have been variously applied to supplement the decent test, namely selfidentification, community recognition, and legal jargon such as ordinary parlance.
B. Descent according to biological criteria (phenotypes, genes, and blood)
Before the law turned to modern biological criteria such as phenotypes
and genes it previously classified race according to discredited scientific theories
such as phrenology. Modern tools of biology do not improve the accuracy of
classification and are just as political as their predecessor terms were decades
before.214 Neither race, nor blood nor genes nor DNA are conclusive criteria for the
classification of a group of people and are, whether intended or not, in effect
mechanisms for political objectives or justifications for oppression, domination and
hierarchy.215 As De Plevitz and Croft explain:
208

Id. at 176.
Reality is mystified in a process that presumes some variables to be immutable and other variables to
be dynamic or dependent. As Tinker explains, ―[a]theory may convey ideological biases in its immanent
structure; particularly through its initial assumptions about what it takes as variable and susceptible to
manipulation and what it treats as fixed and thus not open to question. … The axioms for theories
frequently serve as conduits for bias.‖ Id.
210
See De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1.
211
Tinker, supra note 207, at 176–77.
212
See generally SANDRA BERNS, TO SPEAK AS A JUDGE: DIFFERENCE VOICE AND POWER (1999);
Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986). Both
authors assert that these forces are not necessarily the only ones acting on a judge.
213
Shaw v Wolf (1999) 163 ALR 205, 215-16 (Austl.).
214
Jennifer Clarke, Law and Race: The Position of Indigenous People, in LAW IN CONTEXT 238
(Stephen Bottomley & Stephen Parker eds., 1997). In other words, genetic or DNA analyses are no
better than methods involving terms such as half-caste, full-blood and pure Aboriginal.
215
RICHARD LEWONTIN, THE DOCTRINE OF DNA: BIOLOGY AS IDEOLOGY, 36-37 & 77 ff. (2001).
209
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The genesis of the test of descent lies in outdated scientific
method that has no place in twenty-first century law. It is a
throw-back to perceptions of race where the peoples of the world
were defined as sub-species of humans according to their
physical characteristics rather than their cultural differences.
Furthermore, the test is in direct contravention of international
human rights instruments which hold that one of the most basic
human rights of any group is the right to define themselves
according to their own customs and laws. International
conventions to which Australia is a signatory utterly reject racial
classification of humans according to genetics.216
Yet biological terms appear in cases where the legal issue is the meaning
of the word Aboriginal, and these terms are used to decide these cases. 217 Even
when the bench is conscious of social-Darwinism and the politics of race and
science, this is no guarantee that the resulting decision will be free of these
sociobiological ideas.218 Nor does the use of cultural criteria necessarily quarantine
the judgment from sociobiological ideas.
C. Descent according to culture (culture, ethnicity, language, archaeology,
sociology, historical records, and genealogy)
Courts also turn to many non-biological forms of evidence to determine
descent such as archaeology, genealogy, history, linguistics, and sociology. These
criteria are never determinate and this is expressly judicially recognised. 219 For
some, they are juridical devices, reinforced through other state apparatuses for the
maintenance and reproduction of nation and capitalism. 220 However, these forms
of evidence also tend to be sociobiological, not so much because of their
methods,221 but because of the question being asked. The question being asked is
De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 5 (The original footnote 33 reads: ―For example Article 9 Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 1994‖).
217
See, e.g., Queensland v Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611 (Austl.); Att‟y Gen. (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 94
ALR 515 (Austl.); Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577 (Austl.). See also De Plevitz & Croft, supra
note 1.
218
Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205, 212 (Austl.) (pointing out that this will be inherent in a system of
law that is not based on self-determination since it does not include Indigenous people at any level of the
determination of the issue of Aboriginality).
219
See id. at 219-22 (commenting on the unreliability of colonial documents as evidence in the context
of Aboriginality); Feio v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, 128 (Austl.) (recognizing expressly
this indeterminacy stating in the context of native title, ―[t]he underlying existence of the traditional
laws and customs is a necessary pre-requisite for native title but their existence is not a suffıcient basis
for recognising native title.‖).
220
BALIBAR & WALLERSTEIN, supra note 73, at 104.
221
To some extent all disciplines will assume sociobiological ideas as a direct consequence of the
process of theory construction, which provides a conduit for metaphysical beliefs to be assumed in the
theory or in its application. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, CENTRAL PROBLEMS IN SOCIAL
THEORY: ACTION, STRUCTURE, AND CONTRADICTION IN SOCIAL ANALYSIS (1979) (naturalising
ideology). See also H.G. Hunt & R. Hogler, Agency Theory as Ideology: A Comparative Analysis Based
216
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based on a fiction – the fiction that nations of people are natural phenomena
(having evolved that way over time) rather than States created through violence
(usually sudden acts of invasion, revolution, or war, and sometimes a process
drawn over hundreds of years of violence as in the case of England). There are no
natural nations only those constructed by force, by law and by ideology. 222
Therefore nations need to naturalise their existence as nations and sociobiology
provides the necessary ideology as the ultimate source of naturalising justification.
Sociobiological justifications are ones that justify according to biology,
nature or science in such a way as to imply or express naturalness. Balibar explains
that there are two ideological elements maintaining the nation, and they are
patriotism, which impresses the ideal nature of the nation, and fictive ethnicity,
which makes the ideal nation a living reality. 223 Fictive ethnicity is the process of
constructing ethnic identity so the individual is born into a pre-existing unified
national identity ordered (among other things) by race and language so that it
appears natural and at the same time this natural national identity is stratified into
further natural status-groups.224 The Aboriginal race of Australia is one of these
status-groups. Like other status groups within a nation its identity will be linked to
its relative place in the national hierarchy and this rank is explained according to
naturalising phenomena, which is necessarily sociobiological.225
In other words the disciplines drawn upon by courts to identify
Aboriginality will construct identity according to this model. Balibar and
Wallerstein point out that ethnicity (or in this case Aboriginality) requires the
construction and naturalisation of a fiction (the fiction of a natural nation). 226
According to Balibar, this process of naturalisation occurs through the vehicles of
language and race.227 Descent according to race was considered immediately above
and typically means identity constructed through biological criteria. 228
Similarly, language can also be a vehicle for the naturalisation of
nationalism. The inculcation of language is something that is taught through the
on Critical Legal Theory and Radical Accounting, 15 ACCT. ORGS. & SOC‘Y 437 (1990); Fahrettin
Okcabol & Tony Tinker, The Market for Positive Theory: Deconstructing the Theory for Excuses, 3
ADVANCES IN PUB. INT. ACCT. 71 (1990); Tinker et al., supra note 207 at 167. It is also a mistake to
consider science as more objective than social science. See, e.g., STEPHEN ROTHMAN, LESSONS FROM
THE LIVING CELL: THE LIMITS OF REDUCTIONISM, 26-27 (2002); RICHARD P. FEYNMAN, THE MEANING
OF IT ALL: THOUGHTS OF A CITIZEN SCIENTIST 20 (1998) (describing the uncertainty of science).
222
BALIBAR & WALLERSTEIN, supra note 73, at 96 ff.
223
Id. (likening fictive ethnicity to a legal fiction).
224
Id. at 195 –196 (discussing status-groups).
225
See generally Ardill, supra note 7 (Chapter 2). Within the Australian nation it is necessary to justify
and naturalise national unity on the one hand (e.g. a single white Australian identity) while naturalising a
hierarchal order on the other (the non-contested inferior social and economic position of Indigenous
Australians). Sociobiology is an ideology sufficiently malleable to maintain this antagonism. Within
sociobiology there are many irreconcilable dichotomies (e.g. competition and cooperation, selfishness
and altruism, natural and artificial, etc.) suitable for the purposes of maintaining and justifying the
antagonism between unity and hierarchy.
226
BALIBAR & WALLERSTEIN, supra note 73, at 96. (―[H]ow can [ethnicity] be produced in such a way
that it does not appear as fiction, but as the most natural of origins?‖)
227
Id. at 96-97.
228
Id. at 99 (―All kinds of somatic or psychological features, both visible and invisible, may lend
themselves to creating the fiction of a racial identity and therefore to representing natural and hereditary
differences between social groups either within the same nation or outside its frontiers.‖).
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education system, the family and the class in which people find themselves. 229
Language as a vehicle for difference was once used to differentiate between them
and us, and more recently within nations to order hierarchy. 230 However, as a
means of categorization, its malleability is also its weakness because by itself the
language community is unable to produce or sustain ethnicity. Language can
transcend the nation and be shared by many. 231 Like race, language is not fixed (or
closed) as a means of categorisation, since although language is often fixed at birth
the individual is capable of learning other languages, and is ―constantly selfrenewing‖ through time. 232
In other words, by analogy, cultural criteria are also indeterminate and this
facilitates additional judicial discretion in the determination of Aboriginality. The
judge can declare that descent is not purely a biological question and is instead a
question to be ascertained according to ordinary parlance. This means a judge can
turn to equally indeterminate social and cultural evidence, which although not
biological is nevertheless sociobiological at least at the conceptual level discussed
above.233
To be more precise, in the Yorta Yorta cases,234 courts preferred colonial
documentary evidence written by a squatter who dispossessed Indigenous people
and a missionary determined to destroy Yorta Yorta culture to impose Christianity
to hold that Yorta Yorta culture had been broken and washed away by the tide of
history, over the oral evidence of the Yorta Yorta people and the fact that they still
practiced their culture.235 The court imposed an impossible evidentiary burden that
the Yorta Yorta people must prove their culture forward from 1788 to the present.
It did this by demanding cultural proof of a bio-cultural lineage.236 In the language
229

Id. at 98.
Id. at 97.
231
Id. at 99 (i.e. Ancient Greek and Latin or literary Arabic)
232
BALIBAR & WALLERSTEIN, supra note 73, at 97. Although the language community seems to be
more abstract than race:
… in reality it is the more concrete since it connects individuals up with an origin
which may at any moment be actualised and which has as its content the common
act of their own exchanges, of their discursive communication, using the
instruments of spoken language and the whole, constantly self-renewing mass of
written and recorded texts.
Id.
233
Id. at 56-60 (noting that racism remains connected to biological stories even though it is often
expressed in cultural terms).
234
Yorta Yorta v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 (Austl.); (2001) 180 ALR 655 (Austl.); (2002) 194 ALR
538 (Austl.).
235
See, e.g., Yorta Yorta, 180 ALR at 700-701 (―The tide of history has indeed washed away any real
acknowledgement of their traditional laws and any real observance of their traditional customs.‖).
236
De Plevitz & Croft, supra note 1, at 8:
While Aboriginal people may generally be direct descendants of the original
inhabitants of their particular part of Australia, their lines of descent are not
necessarily biological. Indigenous customary law does not rely on linear proof of
descent in the Judeo-Christian genealogical form Seth begat Enosh begat Kenan.
An indigenous person from Central Australia, for example, will have many
fathers and mothers. A person may have been adopted into a Kinship group
where there is no direct or suitable offspring to carry out ceremonial obligations.
The place where a woman was when she first felt the quickening of her child
within her womb: ―links a person not only with a Dreaming and its track, but also
230

42

TRIBAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 11

of sociobiology, Yorta Yorta culture had become extinct having lost the struggle
for survival with the more competitive and dominant Western culture - an
inevitable consequence of the forces of evolution. 237
Biology and culture tend to supplement each other because neither can
provide determinate results alone. This is apparent in the case analysis that follows.
The fact that a legal system that is said to prefer individual autonomy, more-often
avoids self-determination in favour of equally ambiguous testing, using the
discretionary criteria of culture and biology suggests the mystification of power
and domination. For this reason it is not possible to ignore the nexus between
naturalising according to cultural or biological criteria, both of which are
sociobiological, and relations of power which structure access to resources and
order and maintain hierarchy. The only way to avoid indeterminacy is to embrace
the international law standard of self-determination.238 Instead, this has not
happened and courts have turned to other criteria such as self-identification,
community recognition, and legal jargon.
D. Self-identification
Self-identification has gradually become more prominent in the cases
concerning Aboriginality. The expression self-identification is not amenable to
definition, and in the leading case of Shaw, Justice Merkel used it in the sense that
―… it encompasses the process by which a person comes to recognise that he or she
is an Aboriginal person.‖239
Initially it was dismissed as only relevant in borderline situations where
some biological evidence (usually blood) was present but the amount was
insignificant and it could also be shown that there was community recognition of
that person. As a sole criterion, self-identification has never been sufficient.240 In
explaining why it has not been acceptable, Justice Pincus reveals a basic
contradiction in legal and liberal theory. After pointing out earlier cases had
with a place on the track where a particular ancestral event took place. This place
is often referred to as the ‗conception site‘. A person retains a life-long
association with his or her conception site and Dreaming‖ (Hayes v Northern
Territory (1999) 97 FCR 32, 43-44). United Nations General recommendations
on the interpretation of international instruments state the way in which members
of a particular racial or ethnic group or groups are to be defined shall be based
upon self-identification by the individual concerned if no justification exists to
the contrary.
Id.
237

James F. Weiner, Diaspora, Materialism, Tradition: Anthropological Issues in the Recent High
Court Appeal of the Yorta Yorta, in 2-18, LAND, RIGHTS, LAWS: ISSUES OF NATIVE TITLE 3 (Grace
Koch ed., 2002), available at http://www.aiatsis.gov.au/ntru/docs/publications/issues/ip02v2n18.pdf
(arguing this is a naïve view of culture as much as it is sociobiological. ―[W]e can draw a contrast
between what is consciously avowed as a principle of membership, self-identification or prescription for
behaviour in a community … and what is passed on below the level of consciousness and cannot be
expressed from within the community as a ‗principle‘. Discussions of ‗tradition‟ that have so far been
proffered by legalists and other experts who are not anthropologists in regard to Aboriginal societies
have concerned themselves exclusively with the first register of culture.‖).
238
See supra note 12, and accompanying text.
239
Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205, 212 (Austl.).
240
See Queensland v Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611, (Austl.).
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interpreted the term Aboriginal to have its ordinary meaning, according to the
golden rule of statutory interpretation,241 Justice Pincus suggested ―the ordinary
meaning of Aboriginal, as used in the community, is a broad one. Ordinary usage
would not apply the term to a person believed to have no Aboriginal ancestry,
however closely associated with Aboriginals.‖ 242
Individuals may be able to self-identify in a market through the choices
they make as purchasers or consumers, but are not free to self-identify their status
as people of one group or another. Implicit in this legal preference for biological
descent over the autonomy of the individual is a respect for the State‘s desire to
control citizenship and to maintain the appearance that the law decides according to
criteria rather than caprice. However, the choice reveals that the law is capricious
to the extent that it applies biological tests that are as vague as individual selfidentification might be. In other words biology provides discretion for the judicial
classification of Aboriginal thereby maintaining colonial power and control over
Indigenous people, as opposed to self-determination. It would be less capricious to
contemplate self-identification according to liberal theory, Article 1 of the ICCPR,
and the legal literature on adoption in customary law as part of the search for a
plain and ordinary meaning of Aboriginal.243
Where self-identification has been used it is on the basis that it is either
probative of descent, or a mere supplement to it. So for example, after taking
judicial notice that there were few full bloods left on the eastern seaboard of
Australia, Justice Drummond held that in borderline cases, where the indigenous
person has only limited rather than substantial descent, either self-identification or
communal recognition might tip the balance sufficiently ―to result in the person in
question being described in ordinary speech as an Aboriginal.‖ 244 Before Shaw, it
was unclear whether the test for self-identification was subjective or objective.
After that case, the test for self-identification is clearly subjective. 245 Even though
a subjective test is welcome it remains unsatisfactory because the judicial approach
is clouded by an evaluation of genuineness and opportunism.246 Any alleged
opportunism or absence of genuineness, if it is an issue at all, is surely a question
for the relevant indigenous community itself in accord with the principle of selfdetermination. Unfortunately, community recognition is an accepted judicial
element for reasons other than the facilitation of self-determination as the following
analysis reveals.

241

See ALASTAIR MACADAM & TOM M. SMITH, STATUTES: RULES AND EXAMPLES 240-41 (2nd ed.
1985).
242
Queensland, 90 ALR at 616.
243
Liberal theory privileges ―individualism‖ as does Article 1 of the ICCPR. For literature on the
customary law of adoption: See generally AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMM‘N supra note 51; Flynn &
Stanton, supra note 92, at 75.
244
Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577, 581, 583 (Austl.).
245
See Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205, 211 (Austl.).
246
Id. at 212 (Justice Merkel remarked, ―[i]t is the genuineness of the identification, rather than its
content, that is the critical issue.‖); see also Gibbs, 128 ALR at 584.
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E. Community Recognition
Unlike the Victorian and liberal view of individuality, the weight of
opinion today is that identity is socially constructed in the sense that it is a two-way
dialectical process.247 Yet until Shaw, self-identification and community
recognition were taken as entirely separate concerns – as supplements to the
descent test.248 As an element in the descent test, Justice Pincus explained that
community recognition would exist where an individual had ―received recognition
as an Aboriginal by Aboriginal organizations‖249
Community recognition did not become part of the test for Aboriginality
because the judiciary was determined to honour self-determination. It was
introduced, as was the case with self-identification above, as a filter for situations
where a person might have Aboriginal blood but was otherwise morphologically
European and had not been raised in an Aboriginal environment.250 To be sure this
was the approach of Justice Pincus at first instance in Queensland v Wyvill, an
approach endorsed on appeal in the Full Federal Court albeit with a slightly
different emphasis and different result. 251 The Full Court expressed concern about
the precision of community recognition, which was accepted in the later case of
Shaw v. Wolf as a legitimate concern but not one that precluded its operation.252
Taken together self-identification and community recognition could and
should constitute the basis for self-determination provided they are processes
controlled by Indigenous people.253 However, while the descent test remains
dominant and indigenous people are not the actual decision-makers in the process,
community recognition will continue as a mechanism for the exercise of judicial
discretion and therefore colonial control over Aboriginal identity.
247

See, e.g., LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 127-86 (Ben Brewster trans., Monthly Review Press 1971); NICK
MANSFIELD, SUBJECTIVITY: THEORIES OF THE SELF FROM FREUD TO HARAWAY (2000).
248
Compare Gibbs, 128 ALR at 585 (holding that either self-identification or community recognition
(rather than both) could supplement the descent test where the person had insufficient (rather than
substantial) Aboriginal blood), with Shaw, 163 ALR at 211 (Justice Merkel remarking that ―[t]hese
observations serve to emphasise the extent to which self-identification, although superficially discrete
from the existence of community recognition, interacts with and is indeed a product of the social and
communal framework surrounding an individual.‖).
249
See Queensland v Wyvill (1989) 90 ALR 611, 617 (Austl.).
250
Id.
251
Compare Queensland v Wyvill 90 ALR at 614-15, with Att‟y Gen. (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 94
ALR 515, 523-24 (Austl.). On appeal, Justice Spender held:
―In my respectful opinion, neither the attribute of self recognition, nor
recognition by ‗the Aboriginal community‘ is a necessary integer in the ordinary
meaning of an Aborigine. … I am not to be taken as saying that, when a person
has to decide whether a person is an Aborigine, the factors of self recognition, or
recognition by persons who are accepted as being Aboriginals, are irrelevant. In
cases at the margin, where Aboriginal descent is uncertain, or where the extent of
Aboriginal descent might, on one view, be regarded as insignificant, each of
those factors may have an evidentiary value in the resolution of the question.‖
Att‟y Gen. (Cth), 94 ALR at 523-24.
252
See Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205, 214 (Austl.) (Justice Merkel found in a few instances dealing
with eleven individuals that there was mixed community recognition. This was then weighed up along
with the evidence of descent and self identification.).
253
Id. at 268.
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F. Legal jargon (ordinary parlance)
Various legal tropes are used in the cases to obscure the indeterminate
nature of law and the associated discretion available to judges. Judicial discretion is
possible through the invocation of the fact versus law dichotomy and through
selective use of the many approaches to statutory interpretation. The effect of the
exercise of judicial discretion through these tropes has been to restrict rather than
enhance Indigenous self-determination.
Judges frequently invoke the fact versus law dichotomy, a distinction
common in cases concerning identity and native title. 254 This false dichotomy
separating matters of fact and matters of law is a rhetorical trope which obscures
judicial discretion and shifts the possibility for error to questions of fact rather than
law.255 In this way the law can maintain integrity and authority. 256 If the fact-law
dichotomy was genuine then it could be expected that the law would not be decided
according to Victorian notions of race based on crude biology, because the law
decides legal questions according to legal principles, whether as a matter of legal
positivism or the declaratory theory of justice. 257 However, as the case analysis that
follows will show, contrary to this assertion, the law elects to determine
Aboriginality according to biological criteria where there is no legal requirement to
do so, and even where it ought not to apply biological tests because it is contrary to
international law.258
Another discretionary judicial device arises as a consequence of statutory
interpretation. All judgments used in the following analysis made a point of stating
that the expression Aboriginal race of Australia as it is used in statutes is to be
254

See, e.g., Yorta Yorta v Victoria (2002) 194 ALR 538, 564 (Austl.):
The critical question is whether the errors of law which were made at trial bore, in
any relevant way, upon the primary judge‘s critical findings of fact that the evidence
did not demonstrate that the claimants and their ancestors had continued to
acknowledge and observe, throughout the period from the assertion of sovereignty
in 1788 to the date of their claim, the traditional laws and customs in relation to land
of their forebears, and that ―before the end of the 19th century, the ancestors
through whom the claimants claim title had ceased to occupy their traditional lands
in accordance with their traditional laws and customs.‖ If those findings of fact
stand unaffected by error of law, the claimants‘ claim to native title fails and their
appeal should be dismissed.

Id.
See Att‟y Gen. (Cth) v Queensland (1990) 94 ALR 515, 519, 522 (Austl).
The hollowness of this fact/law dichotomy is illustrated by the fiction of the doctrine of terra nullius
embraced by Australian law between 1788 until 1992. It was overturned in 1992 as a matter of fact and
law in Mabo v Queensland (1992) 107 ALR 1 (Austl.), where the High Court held that the common law
had been based on an incorrect understanding of fact. As a result of the Mabo decision, a new fiction of
Crown sovereignty has been applied according to fact and law. Crown sovereignty applies as a matter of
law despite the myth of terra nullius because sovereignty is an international law issue and cannot be
challenged in an Australian court, Mabo, 170 ALR at 20. The legacy of this fiction of terra nullius
continues to apply as a matter of fact because in subsequent cases such as Yorta Yorta, the High Court
accepted that the tide of history had washed away the rights of the Yorta Yorta people. Yorta Yorta, 194
ALR at 567, 570-71, 584-85.
257
See Yorta Yorta v Victoria [1998] FCA 1606 para 21 (Austl.); Yorta Yorta v Victoria (2002) 194
ALR 538, 564 (Austl.). At trial and on final appeal, the case was said to be determined according to law
not according to righting the wrongs of the past or on notions of justice.
258
See supra notes 11 & 12, and accompanying text (contrary to the principle of self-determination).
255
256
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understood according to its plain and ordinary meaning or according to ordinary
parlance. This approach to statutory interpretation affords the judge discretion to
ascertain meaning according to their opinion of contemporary views attributable to
society. If it were possible to approach the problem objectively in this way, it
stands to reason that whatever hierarchy exists in a society would be replicated in
the attributed meaning of the words in question. In other words, if the society held
racist views to justify a hierarchy based on sociobiological ideology then this
approach (viz, ordinary parlance), if applied objectively, would inevitably
reproduce those views in the judgement. Because there is no identifiable
community parlance other than the judges‘ subjective speculation (usually by
turning to dictionaries, which can often be tainted by subtle prejudice anyway) 259
the absence of sociobiological reasoning will ultimately depend on the particular
judicial officer‘s understanding of the literature on this topic because sociobiology
is so ubiquitous and fundamental to Western hegemony and ontology.
Other approaches to statutory interpretation more likely to benefit
Indigenous people are rarely contemplated. Judges might avoid the less beneficial
results by turning to extrinsic materials such as Law Reform Reports, International
Law, Explanatory Memoranda, and Parliamentary debates. These extrinsic
materials provide an indirect means of interpretation in accord with the rule of
interpretation that extrinsic material can be used to ascertain mischief.260 Reference
to extrinsic materials would also be compatible with an approach to statutory
interpretation according to the rule that a beneficial statute should be liberally
construed in favour of the class of persons meant to benefit, or alternatively to
apply the mischief rule so as to give the statute a purposive interpretation.261 In
addition, international law prefers self-determination, and where possible greater
effect should be given to self-identification and community recognition than
descent, in the absence of a system of self-determination. Of the several cases that
have considered Aboriginality to date, only one case approached the issues in this
way.262 Finally, the international law principle of self-determination is exhorted by
way of standpoint theory263 as the surest way to proceed in this area of law. In other
words, these issues are best approached by starting with the standpoint of the most
oppressed. In the context of Aboriginality this means self-determination according
to Aboriginal laws, customs and traditions, and not according to colonial authority.

259

See, e.g., Gibbs v Capewell (1995) 128 ALR 577, 580 (Austl.) (Judge Drummond consulted the
Macquarie Dictionary 2nd ed. which gave as the meaning of Aborigine the following anachronistic and
racist definition: ―one of a race of tribal peoples, the earliest inhabitants of Australia.‖) (emphasis
added).
260
ALASTAIR MACADAM & TOM M. SMITH, supra note 241, at 8-10. In other words, to understand the
mischief the legislation was meant to address.
261
Id. at 243-45.
262
Shaw v Wolf (1998) 163 ALR 205 (Austl.). In other cases only some, rather than all, of these
considerations were entertained.
263
See Sandra Harding, Comment on Walby‟s “Against Epistemological Chasms: The Science Question
in Feminism Revisited”: Can Democratic Values and Interests Ever Play a Rationally Justifiable Role
in the Evaluation of Scientific Work? 26 SIGNS 511 (2001) available at
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3175451.
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CONCLUSION
Australia has yet to apply self-determination to Australian Aboriginals
despite its ratification of a significant body of international law. Yet other
comparable jurisdictions, Canada, New Zealand and the United States have either
implemented self-determination or they have embraced it in principle. That is to
say, unlike Australia which is found wanting on the question of self-determination,
these other jurisdictions ‗all recognise the power and authority of Indigenous
people to make decisions affecting their lives‘.264
An analysis of the cases deciding Aboriginal identity has provided direct
evidence of sociobiology in Australian law. This is because Australian cases apply
anachronistic conceptions of biology such as blood, genes, DNA, etc., to sustain
colonial control on the basis of race. Yet science has moved well beyond the
Victorian view of a hierarchy of races. Instead science now accepts there is only
one race – the human race. Even where judges seek to avoid overt sociobiology by
turning to social and cultural evidence they necessarily fail because the question
they asked was one presuming multiple human races.
This will continue to be the approach until Australia embraces the concept
of self-determination and shares power with Indigenous people on that basis. It
follows that sociobiology is present in law because Australia refuses to relinquish
control over Indigenous people by agreeing to self-determination. The nexus
between race, power, oppression, colonialism, nation, and sociobiology is clear in
this area of law. There is direct evidence that the law uses sociobiology to
determine Aboriginal identity.
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Brennan et al., supra note 29, at 343.
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